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ABSTRACT
This study explores the role of NGOs in Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and
development process. The study was motivated by a perception obtained from a preliminary
literature acquaintance and events that pointed to the developing of a centralised, state-led
model. As a result, NGOs were facing funding crises and political pressure which were
obstructing their participation in the process. Thus, the study sought to investigate the
substance of these trends and how NGOs were responding to them. The study finds that the
current policy dynamics underlying the process supports the perception that a centralised,
state-led model is developing. At the same time, NGOs are shifting their engagement from
emergency work to a development paradigm; they are focusing their activities on rural
development and civic awareness; and they are lobbying for the opening of the public space.
NGOs believe that they can contribute a unique socib-economic and political capital to the
process which neither the public sector nor the private sector can. For this, they argue that the
process should be participatory to enable openness and accommodate the contributions of all
social actors. However, they believe that the government should playa leading role because
of the need to create the infrastructural basis the country lacks to rebuild and develop.
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This study looks at the role of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in development, with
a specific focus on Angola' s post-conflict reconstruction and development process. After
independence from Portuguese colonialism in 1975, Angola was immersed in a civil war that
lasted for nearly three decades until it finally ended in early 2002. The war had erupted as a
direct result of power struggle between the three political movements that led the national
liberation struggle (Teka 2006:24( Its end in 2002 came after the death of the leader of the
anned opposition movement and the signing of a memorandum of peace between the anned
opposition movement and the ruling party.
From 1975 to 1992, when the country underwent its first democratic electoral process2, the
incumbent party was communist and ruled the country under a one-party regime. During this
regime, NGOs were donnant since civil assembly and association were outlawed. Only
organisations created by the vanguard patty itself were allowed to operate. Such
organisations served as instmments of political and ideological mobilisation for the party
(Faria 2003). It was not until early 1990s that NGOs and the larger civil society organisation
could begin to emerge following the sanctioning of civil activities under the 1991 Association
Law, Law 14/91 (Comerford 2006). Although many local NGOs were initially state-linked,
they have gradually grown more autonomous and critical of the political status quo. This has
not been least influenced by partnerships with donor-agencies and international NGOs (Faria
2003; Hodges 2004:88).
From 1992 to 2002, the country alternated from peace to war as peace agreements were
repeatedly violated. During warring times, NGOs acted as humanitarian agents and
international assistance was primarily channelled through United Nations humanitarian
agencies and international NGOs. Since the end of the war in 2002, the bulk of this assistance
has been channelled through the government toward macro reconstruction projects. As a
result, the number of international NGOs active in the country is decreasing3; local NGOs,
I People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA), and National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA).
2 Legislative elections took place for the second time on September 5,2008. Although the results have given the
ruling party an overwhelming victory, the major opposition party, UN ITA, has claimed procedural irregularities,
and is set to challenge the results in court. Presidential elections are envisaged for 2009.
3 The number of international NGGs decreased from 97 in 2006 to 78 in 2007 (UTCAH 2007).
who have mainly depended on intermediary funding from donors through international
NGOs, are facing funding crisis; and the government has used the political legitimacy that it
is gradually obtaining from the international community as a leverage against NGO activity
in the country (Chatham 2005:10; DWA 2006a).
In this juncture, concern rises about the survival and role of NGOs, as a distinct forn1 of civil
society organisation, in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development process.
Thus, the current study sought to investigate the following main question: what policy
response are NGOs, local and international, giving to ensure their relevance in the country's
post-conflict reconstruction and development process? This question aimed to ascertain what
value NGO stakeholders believe the sector can contribute to the country's reconstruction
process, whose absence could be an asset cost.
For consideration of the main research question, the following sub-questions were posed:
What theoretical and practical instruments are NGOs pursuing for the sector to survive and
lend its contribution to the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development context?
How do [NGO] stakeholders understand the role/value of NGOs in Angola's post-conflict
reconstruction and development process?
What are the major debates on the issue of centralisation and decentralisation of Angola's
post-conflict reconstruction and development process?
The study is theoretically posed within the broader context of post-conflict politics that
emerged after the Cold War. This politics is framed in the Peacebuilding Agenda that the
United Nations introduced in 1992. Contrary to the reactive politics of the Cold War, the new
agenda posits a proactive approach to conflict. It advocates pre-crisis intervention, peace
searching and peacebuilding based on "preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding" (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np)4. Respectively, these pillars
predicate engagement with existing and potential disputes before they escalate into crisis,
halting conflict and preserving peace once it is attained, and preventing recurrence of conflict
4 The np symbol is used in the text to indicate that a document is not paginated or that pages are not available.
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(Boutros-Ghali I992:np). This engagement has been mediated by a set of political principles,
a two-prong diplomatic mechanism and an operational agenda. The political principles
involve "fundamental human rights, state sovereignty and integrity, humanity, neutrality and
impartiality" (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). And the diplomatic mechanism refers to international
assistance as an instrument of relief and development, and to policy response to the
phenomenon of "new wars" which have defined the face of conflict in the post-Cold War era.
The priority areas of the operational agenda have been demilitarisation, peace and security,
humanitarian assistance, support to displaced peoples, human rights monitoring,
democratisation and good governance, infrastructure and economic development. These
interventions have been posited as crucial for the advancement of reconciliation,
rehabilitation and development (Eric et af 2007:3). In this agenda, NGO activity has found
opportune resource, political and structural spaces to evolve by having been co-opted by the
United Nations, international institutions and liberal states of the North as complementary
partners in the work of reconstruction, peacebuilding and development in post-conflict
context (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np; Reimann 2006:46).
The study finds that policy dynamics, national and international policy developments towards
Angola, support a centralised, state-led development model. The primacy that NGOs had as
welfare and sustainability agents during the conflict period is politically fading out. Instead,
the state is being elevated to the leading role in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and
development. This is the reason why NGOs, especially local NGOs, are facing funding crises
because the bulk of international assistance is by policy now being channelled through the
government towards macro development projects. And the government has used the
legitimacy it is obtaining from the international community as a political leverage against
NGO activity in the country. In response, NGOs believe that they still have a unique socio-
economic and political contribution to make in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and
development process, which neither the public sector nor the private sector can. For this,
NGOs are shifting their engagement from emergency work to a development paradigm; they
are focusing most of their activities on rural development and civic awareness; and they are
lobbying for the opening of the public space so that every social actor can lend their
contribution. However, NGOs are of the view that the public sector should have a leading
role in creating the infrastructural basis the country needs to rebuild and develop.
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The study has six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapters two and three
engage with literature on the role that NGOs have played on the international stage and the
comparative role they are being assigned in Angola's post-conflict reconstruction process,
respectively. Chapter four discusses the methods and methodologies employed in the study,
and chapter five engages with fieldwork data. The text ends with a synthesis chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROLE OF NGOs IN THE PEACEBUILDING AGENDA
2. Introduction
This chapter engages with literature on the role that NGOs have played on the international
stage of the Peacebuilding Agenda that was fonnally introduced by former UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. This agenda establishes the broader context in which
the project of development has been evolving since the end of the Cold War. As such, the
review focuses on two aspects. The first is the role NGOs have been assigned on this agenda
at international level. The second is the comparative role NGOs are being assigned in the
post-conflict reconstruction and development process that Angola has been undergoing since
the three decade civil war ended in 2002. This review structure is based on the broader
objective of the study which is to identify what specific contribution NGOs can make in
Angola's reconstruction and development. The review looks at the principles on which the
Peacebuilding Agenda is built, namely, "human security" and "sovereignty", and aid as an
instrument of relief and development. This is followed by the debate on the "new wars"
phenomenon. On the second part, focus is placed on how the different elements of the
Peacebuilding Agenda relate to Angola's reconstruction context.
2.1 The [post-conflict] Peacebuilding Agenda
Formally, the "post-conflict peacebuilding agenda" goes back to An Agenda for Peace:
Preventive diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping (1992i proposal made by former
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros-Ghali. This proposal was a pursuant to the
conclusion of the UN Security Council Heads of State and Government level [first time]
Summit held on 31 January 1992. The summit had argued that "the absence of war and
military states does not itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become
threats to peace and security" (Macrae 2001:32). Thus, the summit issued a communique that
called on the UN Secretary-General to issue, for circulation to the UN member states, "an
analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within
the framework and provisions of the [UN] Charter the capacity of the United Nations for
5 A subsequent and more detailed paper was formulated in 1995 under the title An Agenda/or Development.
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preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping" (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). In
An Agenda for Peace (1992) proposal, Boutros-Ghali added a fourth concept: post-conflict
peacebuilding, arguing that all the four concepts are both interconnected and distinct in their
individual inputs; that they are interconnected in the purpose of securing peace, yet distinct
on how each contributes to the process of securing the peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np).
Preventive diplomacy is defined as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties,
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict" and to limit occurring conflicts
from spreading (Boutros-Ghali I992:np). Peacemaking is defined as action to bring
belligerent parties together into conflict resolution space. Peacekeeping is defined as "a
technique" to expand possibilities of both conflict prevention and peacemaking. This is to be
pursued through UN physical presence in field of conflict by using either UN military, police,
personnel or even civilian deployment. And post-conflict peacebuilding is the overall end-
goal of all the four concepts. It is defined as the process of preventing "the recurrence of
conflict among nations and peoples". This involves action to identify and establish "support
structures" that can consolidate peace and advance welfare (Boutros-Ghali 1992: np, 1994:
np). That is how the entire agenda has been generally called "peacebuilding agenda".
However, the term "post-conflict" has been widely debated. The World Bank (1998) and
even the UN Humanitarian Commission for Refugees (UNHCR 1999) have recognised that
the term "post-conflict" fails to account for the reality of continued experience of violence
beyond formal ceasefires. The UNHCR has remarked,
.. .it may be inaccurate, even misleading to talk about 'post-conflict situations' as such
situations do not pass directly from conflict to post-conflict conditions. We shall however
retain the tem1 'post-conflict' to indicate those war-tom societies that are undergoing some
form of transition towards a more peaceful and stable situation. (UNHCR 1999: xviii)
As the quote indicates, notwithstanding the controversy, the term has been retained "with the
caveat that it does not imply absolute peace" (Macrae 2001 :42). From political economic and
international relations perspectives, critics have argued that there is ambivalence between the
concept of post-conflict development and humanitarian relief projects and programmes, as
well as a militancy between "neoliberal and more interventionist visions of development in
general" (Moore 2007a:388). Concerning the first claim, it is observed that the claimed "post-
conflict era" is not devoid of conflict. And despite the recognition that continuing conflicts
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being experienced in certain contexts may demonstrate considerably "apolitical tendencies"
(Moore 2007a:388), critics argue that the "post-conflict" concept could be a strategy to
excuse main development agencies and rich nations for reducing their assistance to complex
emergency situations in the Third World. Notwithstanding the risk that protracted assistance
may feed into the dependency syndrome, critics argue that pulling out assistance in the face
of critical needs does not produce better outcome either since life remains challenged during
the transitional phase from conflict to post-conflict (Cohen and Anderson 1999; Moore
2007a). Concerning the claim of militancy between neoliberal and more interventionist
visions of development, it has been argued that the "post-conflict" concept supports the status
quo of structural adjustment policies, which are now designed as poverty strategy papers,
"instead of the supposed dependency-inducing tendencies of welfarist humanitarian
assistance" (Moore 2007a:391, see also Edkins 1996). In this light, Moore (2007a:397)
argues that the debate being raised here is not about choice between relief and development,
but about the kind of development that can best be pursued in the Third World. Like other
critics, Moore (2007a:397) argues that the "post-conflict" concept contributes to a capitalistic
development approach that proves to be unsuitable for recovery in the transitional phase from
conflict .to post-conflict. Moreover, such an approach remains ideologically ambivalent as
long as the humanitarian relief agenda is extant (Moore 2007a:397). Thus, two prominent
terms, believed to better describe the vision captured by the UN's proposal, have been used
as alternatives to the "post-conflict" term. The UN Research Institute for Social Development
has used the term "war-tom societies" instead of "post-conflict situations" and others have
suggested the term "complex political emergencies" (Macrae 1998; Moore 2007b). Some
authors suggest that despite ambiguities and complexes involved, the term "post-conflict" is
still applicable to some situations in Africa (Duffield 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Given
its hegemonic source, however, the term "post-conflict" has prevailed even in critical
literature, although mostly employed in descriptive terms rather than as an endorsement.
The post-conflict peacebuilding agenda, as articulated by the UN, recognises the end of the
Cold War as an opportunity for ideological shift from reactive and adversarial politics to
proactive and globally constructive politics. It also recognises the shift that occurred from the
interstate nature of conflict during the Cold War to the intrastate nature of conflict in the post-
Cold War era. In terms of principle, the peacebuilding agenda was built on the notions of
"fundamental human rights", "state sovereignty and integrity", and on the principles of
"humanity, neutrality and impartiality" which were ratified by the General Assembly
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resolution 46/182 of December 1991 (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). Following these premises,
new approaches have emerged in foreign policy and international relations agendas, in the aid
system, and in development praxis generally. These various topics are surveyed ahead.
Operationally, the agenda for peace includes the elements of demilitarisation, peace and
security, humanitarian assistance, support to displaced peoples, human rights monitoring,
democratisation and good governance, infrastructure and economic development (Boutros-
Ghali 1992:np; Reimann 2006:46).
Because of convenience and relevance, the notions of "humanity, neutrality and impartiality"
are explored ahead under the review of the aid system and the theme of "new wars", while
the notions of "human security (or fundamental human rights)" and "state sovereignty and
integrity" are separately considered next.
2.1.1 Human Security
An Agenda jar Peace (1992) was announced in an optimistic time characterised by a relative
success of a first round of peace agreements that followed the end of the Cold War, such as in
Angola 1991, Cambodia 1991, Nicaragua 1991, El Salvador 1992, Mozambique 1992
(Pearce 2005). This announcement has been considered the first phase of the peacebuilding
agenda (Pearce 2005; Shannon 2004:38). Macrae (2001:32) and Pearce (2005) posit that the
UN was seeking for a new role in the global stage, which, in An Agenda for Peace. it
commendably articulated as the pursuit of global peace.
Initially, the term "human security" did not per se feature in UN policy documents until its
mainstreaming into all UN agencies and activities following the UN reforms begun in 1997
(Shannon 2004:38)6. However, the meaning that it came to embody from the mid-l 990s had
already been essentially captured in An Agenda for Peace proposal. It was captured in the
notion of fundamental human rights as the centre of the agenda and work of peace in the
world, and in the interconnection made between the political, economic, social and
environmental aspects of development. This interconnection and its success were posited as
necessary structural basis for meeting fundamental human rights of people. The 1992 version
of An Agenda for Peace stated, "The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To
6 In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced a "comprehensive reform agenda that included a
review of programming tools used by the UN system" (UNDAF 2005/2008:6).
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reach them will requIre our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider
prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive
weapons". This framework is reaffirmed and elaborated in the 1995 An Agenda for
Development which reinforced the idea of global sharing of the benefits of economic
liberalisation and growth "among all countries and peoples" (Boutros-Ghali 1995:np).
Subsequently, global compacts began to adjust their activities to this vision. This conceptual
evolution was not least marked by the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights which
linked human rights with development, democracy, environmental responsibility and peace.
It sawall these factors as "interrelated and interdependent" and as part and parcel of
individual rights (Shannon 2004:37-38). The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report
interpreted the concept of peacebuilding as a component of "human security" which it
defined as people's ability to choose a future they want and to secure a livelihood. This
understanding delineated a conceptual shift from the state and military senses of security to
the security of individual human person even within the boundaries of a nation state. This
understanding has also been markedly propounded by the Canadian School in Canada.
Axworthy (1997) argues that human security involves economic security, decent living,
guarantee of fundamental human rights and physical safety. Individual access to these life
conditions should be the measure of global security. He posits that although state security
may remain an important condition for people's security, this security has increasingly
proved insufficient to guarantee people's security since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the
security of many citizens has been threatened instead of protected by their states (Axworthy
1997,2001,2004). For example, minority Muslims in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kosovards
in Serbia, Kurds in Turkey, and Tutsis in Rwanda were targets of "structural violence",
meaning insecurity perpetrated by ruling people groups within sovereign state borders (Swan
1995:41).
Notwithstanding the consensus that human security should be primarily people-centred rather
than state-centred, the definition of what it involves has been debatable. One camp posits a
narrower definition of human security as a set of essentials that can put a person's life at high
risk, including "poverty, health, education, and civic and political freedoms". Because a
narrow definition, it is argued, makes causal analysis more feasible and can provide better
guide for policy-making (King and Murray 2000; Krause 2004; Mack 2004; Macfarlane
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2004; Paris 2001). In response, the other camp posits that concern should not be primarily
about workable definition, but rather about the reality that even such security essentials are
also to be interpreted in terms of security as people-centred rather than as outside notions that
can determine the content of [human] security. As such, the definition toolkit also expands
since the concern is no longer threats alone but also society's ability to counter such threats
(Alkire 2004; Axworthy 2004; Bajpai 2004; Hampson 2004; Thakur 2004; Winslow and
Eriksen 2004).
At donor level, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) pushed their
policy guidelines and practice "further into the world and work of development" (Shannon
2004:35). From a high level meeting of the DAC held in May 1995 emerged the DAC
Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 2F 1
Century. This document premises the achievement of "structural stability" as the goal of
development cooperation. That is, there is to be "coherence between aid and foreign and
defence policies" (Macrae 2001 :33). In 1996, the European Commission issued a
communique to the European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament under the
title Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. Similar to the UN proposal, this
document advocated for the concept of "structural stability" i.e. "sustainable economic
development, democracy, respect for human rights, viable political structures and health,
social and environmental conditions" as a bridging link between European trade, aid and
security policy (EC 1996:np; see also EC 2001:13-22). Macrae (2001:33) observes that this
document was a contribution toward a common European Union foreign and security policy
following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 19947. This link and its implications are
further explored in the sections 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 ahead.
2.1.2 State Sovereignty and Integrity
Concurrent with the notion of human security 1S the notion of "state sovereignty and
integrity". An Agenda for Peace (1992) posits state sovereignty and integrity "as the
fundamental entity of the international community ... the foundation-stone of this work [of
7 Formally known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), was signed between member countries of the
European Continent on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht, Netherlands.
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peace]8 is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity
are crucial to any common international progress". However, it also clearly notes that "the
time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed; its theory was never matched by
reality .. .it is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance
between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more
interdependent world" (Boutros-Ghali I992:np).
Two elements are central in the above quote: sovereignty and standard of governance as
bases for international relations and global peace and security. The element of state
sovereignty bears continuity from the Cold War regime during which it was promoted by
both the capitalist and communist blocs who courted sovereign states for alignment with their
respective ideological positions and development models, and in this way direct military
confrontation between the two superpowers was also avoided (Macrae 2001:8). However, it
has been argued that the origin of the policy of unconditional sovereignty and integrity is not
only the Cold War regime despite the geopolitical benefits that the two superpowers obtained
from it. It also derives from decolonisation politics. This politics held a homogeneous,
Western model of statehood which predicated as sovereign a state with control over a
delimited territorial space and with the purpose and ability to gamer and redistribute
resources for the public good (Jackson 1990: 12; Clapham 1996:5). However, in the post-Cold
War development agenda, the principle of state sovereignty is no longer unconditional.
Instead, it becomes conditioned upon the standard of "good governance". It is in view of this
fundamental ideological line that the proposal for greater democratisation and larger
development assistance is posited and understood in An Agenda for Peace (1992). While
wealthier member states and international institutions are particularly persuaded to contribute
more to the rising needs of the world, recipient states are advised to pursue good governance,
to safeguard civil, human, social and political rights within their sovereign borders through
more liberalised and democratic politics and practice (Boutros-Ghali 1992:np). This element
of state sovereignty is further considered in the review of aid politics below.
8 Italics ismy emphasis
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2.2 International Assistance and the Peacebuilding Agenda
Aid has been an integral part of international relations and political economy since the end of
the Second World War. From 1940s to 1970s, aid transfer from North to South was premised
on the principle of sovereignty and the vision of development (Jackson 1990; Macrae 2001).
As observed in the previous section, the principle of sovereignty is posited to have drawn, on
the one hand, on decolonisation politics since the Western model of statehood was also
assumed for the newly independent states of the South (Jackson 1990; Clapham 1996). On
the other hand, the notion of sovereignty was also largely influenced by geopolitical interests
of the superpowers during the Cold War. Both the capitalist and communist blocs engaged in
aid projects (Macrae 2001: 12). Importantly, the sovereignty principle implies that an aid
recipient state-government was assumed to be benign, holder of "juridical and empirical"
power and capacity to adequately manage and distribute aid resources (Macrae 2001 :4).
In tum, despite the rivalry of socialism from the soviet bloc, modernisation theory, which was
prominent in the capitalist bloc, arguably dominated the development rationale of aid among
the capitalists. Aid was viewed as a means to advance progress by compensating the victims
of the evolutionary process of development through "transfer of public resources from the
rich countries of Western Europe and North America to the Third World" (Macrae 2001: 12;
see also Larrain 1989). This rationale was not only economistic in that it was viewed as the
best way to advance global progress, but also politically expedient in terms of relations
between North and South (Jackson 1990; Macrae 2001). On this account, the real purpose of
aid during the mentioned period is said to have been "palliative" i.e. one of appeasing poorer
Third World states from succumbing to the flatteries of socialism, as well as to alleviate
"humanitarian crises associated with contemporary [proxy] wars" (Macrae 2001 :2).
Between 1970s-1980s, the aid system obtained some significant changes, although
maintaining a centrally humanitarian and relief purpose. According to Macrae (2001:4), it
began to be adjusted to respond to the reality of "quasi-statehood". The latter is a state theory
propounded initially by Jackson (1990) and then furthered by Clapham (1996). They posit as
"quasi" the Third World states that lack "juridical and empirical" powers i.e. legitimacy and
tangible territorial control to replicate the functions that their Western prototypes exert. Thus,
aid channelling from North to South obtained two new aspects. One was the Structural
Adjustment Programmes, also called "redistribution with growth and basic needs approach",
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whose policy objective was human development and creation of "an enabling environment
for economic growth through a series of economic policy reforms" (Macrae 2001: 14). The
addition of this aspect to the aid system was arguably motivated by the twin factors of the
declining intensity of the Cold War and the economic crisis of the 1970s that severely
affected most of the developing countries' economies. In terms of policy, governments were
advised to cut-down on basic services and infrastructure expenditures and to pursue
privatisation (Duffield 1991; Streeten 1981), while NGOs were promoted as primary agents
of humanitarian and relief intervention over the state. Multilateral assistance and a bulk of
bilateral assistance began to be channelled through NGOs for humanitarian relief (Commins
2000:71; Hillhorst 2003:218). This development agency issue is explored ahead in the review
of the role ofNGOs in the development agenda.
With the end of the Cold War and the launch of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, aid obtained a
new dimension as an instrument of international relations and development. Besides the
humanitarian and relief object, the Agenda for Peace also proposed aid as a useful instrument
in the prevention and resolution of intrastate conflict and in advancing global development
(Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994; Macrae 2001:2). Its dispensation, however, was conditioned
upon the practice of democratic politics and alignment with the principle of flexible
sovereignty as measured by the standard of good governance (Boutros-Gha1i 1992). This
means that aid can and should seek to fulfil simultaneously both a relief and a developmental
function, hence the notion of "relief-development continuum". Moreover, the peace proposal
also means that in order to access international aid, aid receiving states have to prove
themselves worthy by demonstrating good [democratic] governance. This implies that the
international community could, without consent from local sovereign authorities, directly
intervene in a country for a just cause i.e. when there is evidence of "extensive violation of
human rights" (Macrae 2001:2). This is exemplified in sanctions that the international
community emitted against Iraq and Serbia in the early 1990s; the international peace
enforcement in Bosnia Herzegovina after 1994 and in Sierra Leone after 1996; the
international humanitarian war fought by NATO in Kosovo against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1999. All these international community interventions, with exception of Iraq,
responded to conflicts within sovereign states borders (Macrae 2001 :2).
But this new aid paradigm has not obtained absolute consensus. Three major critiques have
been made on its viability and purpose, points that were briefly mentioned in the previous
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section on state sovereignty. Macrae (2001 :4) contends that the additional element of
development assumes that the problem of quasi-statehood still being experienced in most aid
receiving countries has been resolved; that unless this problem is adequately addressed,
development aid can only exacerbate existing conflicts instead of assisting to resolve them,
and any possible impact it could have on sustainable development would be undermined.
This is because a weak [local] state just cannot provide "the legal, institutional and
operational tools" that development aid needs in order to engage effectively (ibid pA-6). In
the same vein, Moore, (cited in Macrae 2001 :6), argues that the neoliberal paradigm in which
development aid is framed actually militates against the strong, empirical state expectation
that aid agencies need in order to operate since this paradigm promotes state minimalism. In
reaction to the 1997 World Bank Development Report which saw cooperation with post-
conflict weak states as necessary in sustainable development efforts9, he argues that the
World Bank's analysis still remains inadequate. It simply revisits the same pragmatism of
decolonisation politics without concretely reflecting on how aid can contribute to the
international legitimacy of fragile states (ibid). In a critique of the analysis by Jackson (1990)
which traces the origins of quasi-statehood to decolonisation politics, Inayatullah and Blaney
(1995) argue that the failures of new states to obtain empirical legitimacy are not only due to
internal factors as suggested by Jackson. Rather, such failures have also been caused by the
global political economic structure which has sustained Third World poverty and
dependency. This is because poverty of itself is a major cause of state fragility.
A second critique posits that while relief aid has been traditionally conceived as politically
neutral, development aid is in fact necessarily partisan because it raises the conditionality bar
from the previous premise of unconditional state sovereignty to the current premise of
democratic satisfaction. This factor gives donor countries and agencies political leverage to
decide what institutional changes need or need not be made as a condition for aid access
(Macrae and Leader 2000; Macrae 2001). Lastly, there is the critique of diminishing aid
package. It is argued that this is being motivated by the increasing emphasis within
development discourse on notions such as "self-reliance, sustainability of assistance, and
partnership", especially in conflict situations, as opposed to dependency and from the need
for capital and savings (Macrae 2001 :40). This is because the cause(s) of conflict is being
9 This policy line is also now being championed by the United States through its "fragile state" policy in the
channelling of its bilateral development aid through USAID to countries needing post-conflict reconstruction
and development assistance.
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increasingly ascribed to internal and psycho-social factors, hence the dominating emphasis on
internal and personal change as a solution (especially in conflict resolution manuals) rather
than on transfer of resources (Adelman 1996; Duffield 1997; Macrae 2001). In the new
development aid context, therefore, recipient countries are being persuaded to become
partners with donor countries and agencies in the implementation of neoliberal economics
and democratic political reforms (Stiglitz 1998; Wolfensohn 1999). This discussion is further
pursued in the review of the so-called "new wars" below.
2.3. "New Wars" and the Peacebuilding Agenda
The concept of "new wars" emerged in the mid-1990s. It was employed to capture the reality
of violent conflicts that have erupted in the post-Cold War era. It is observed that most of
these wars have occurred in the South, although they are a global phenomenon. They have
been experienced in direct geographical incidences of violence and through interlinkages
between global politics and economy and the effects and factors of such conflicts (Ballentine
and Sherman 2003: 8-9). Kaldor (1999:7, 199) posits that the new wars are "local, global,
national and transnational". This geographical transcendence is permeated by aid, bilateral
relations between nation states, liberalising trade and the black market in which conflicting
parties are trading agents, the role of international institutions, global security, and the global
effects of people displacement and refugees (Kaldor 1999: 199). Ballentine and Sherman
(2003:8-9) remark that both "the supply and demand sides of war-making have become more
internationalised" as warring agents have tended to exploit the opportunities of international
free markets to trade in lucrative natural resources for war equipments and financing.
Generally, the direct incidence of the new wars has been observed to be mostly "intrastate"
rather than "interstate" or conventional. Shannon (2004:35) informs us that about 90% of
conflict occurrence between the 1990s and early 2000s was within states. Sirvard (1993)
observes that although this unconventional form of warfare has existed since the end of
Second World War, this was not a frontline development issue during the period 1945-1992,
even though the peak of war mortality was in the 1950s and not in the 1990s. In the 1990s,
the new wars became a major development issue not least because of their mainstream
conceptualisation as being a result of "processes of maldevelopment", which poses a threat to
international security (Macrae 2001 :38). This thesis is particularly associated with Kaplan
(1994) who argued that West African and Yugoslav wars were a matter of "loose molecules";
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that these societies failed to respond positively to the experience of demographic diversity
and modernisation. Thus they succumbed to anarchy i.e. "new barbarism" (Cramer
2002: 1848). Kaldor (1999: 8-9) posited that the collapse of the soviet bloc in the 1990s
brought about "political, social and economic uncertainty" for many former satellite states
and proxy agents. This opportunistic environment "opened a field for internal political
aspirations, individuals and groups emerged eager to establish new systems and structures".
However, these processes lacked foundational principles that could shape "a better future
society". Instead, appeal is made to identity and subgroup support within a society. As such,
the new wars are "not a progressive but a retrograde phenomenon" (Kaldor 1999:9).
This mainstream thinking has not gone unchallenged. Many authors have interpreted the new
wars phenomenon more positively as a necessary process of "social transformation"
(Duffield 2002: 1053). Cramer (2002: 1849) argues that one blurred reality underlying the new
wars is "powerful material interests" of international actors in geographical incidences of
conflict; that this factor was neglected by ideological explanations for conflicts in Africa,
Asia and the Middle East during the Cold War period. And this factor was also sidelined by
"naive explanations" for these wars, namely, "primordial ethnic antipathies" between
belligerents. He concludes that the new wars cannot be analysed without considering the
power factor. That is, many incidences of conflict have been stirred by struggle to end
"hierarchy" i.e. "regime change" toward more accommodating politics and societal
organisation. And this has been a particular experience in post-colonial and post-Cold War
contexts where external pressures for democratisation have been exerted. Thus, although
grievance for "end of hierarchy" may not be sufficient to cause conflict, it nevertheless opens
up opportunistic environment for "desperate conflict over position, power, wealth, VOIce,
survival" (Cramer 2002:1857). Duffield (2002:1051) argues that the new wars are a
"resistance" to global liberal governance that is being promoted through elitist politico-
economic reforms across the world. As such, rather than "social regression", the new wars
may signify a process toward alternative societal organisations to westernisation. This
insinuation is echoed in Macrae's (2001 :39) argument that the violence of the new wars is not
being "orchestrated by the poor only and primarily", but by political elites in order "to
maintain power through control over means of production". Therefore, in order to resolve the
conflicts, it is not enough to seek to compensate the losers of development. It is also
necessary to confront those who have benefited from development (Macrae 2001: 39).
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Critics posit as the primary fallacy of the mainstream thinking the neoclassical economics
framework. Based on the premise of methodological individualism and the logic of optimum
choice, neoclassical war economists and scholars have studied the cause of the violent
conflicts in the frame of "greed vs. grievance" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003:6). Homo
Economicus has explained [all] the situations and motivations for the new wars through its
"greed theory", positing that greed, rather than grievance for justice or change for the better,
undergirds the new wars (Azam 2001; Grossman 1991; Hirshleifer 1994). Keen (2000:26)
posits that many combatants see more to war than winning, because they exploit conflict
situation to accumulate crude resources, and this economic rationale motivates such war
agents irrespective of cumulative consequences their actions may bear on collective society.
Collier (2000: 14), who headed a World Bank research team that undertook a series of
quantitative statistical analyses to determine what variables were most salient to the risk of
violent conflict for all the civil wars since 1965 to late 1990s, reported that "ethnic
heterogeneity, level of political rights, economic mismanagement and regime change type"
have no statistical bearing on the incidence of civil war. Rather, the real factors are economic,
especially in resource rich countries. Later, Collier and Hoeffer (2001:3-7) propounded the
"greed theory" in terms of opportunity for organised violence. They posited that easy
acquisitIon of war funds through access to lucrative natural resources, to diaspora networks
and redundant and uneducated youth make war feasible regardless of grievance. Vlassenroot
and Romkema (2002) have posited that "stakeholder analysis", structural strategies for
resource management, and equitable economic governance make adequate responses in
efforts to curb violent conflicts. These propositions are based on the deduction that violent
conflicts involve beneficiary actors. Thus, to curb violence, the bounty hunters in a conflict
are to be identified, and resource reserves and trading are to be structurally monitored at both
local and international levels (ibid). As Cramer (2002: 1847) observes, some Homo
Economicus authors have also formulated the "greed theory" in terms of the trade-off
between the risk of war and the pay-off of war. They argue that although conflict is
dangerous, war agents would choose war if they judged that the pay-off of a war outweighed
its calculated risk (see also Azam 2001; Grossman 1991; Neary 1997).
The counterargument is that the Homo Economicus' "greed vs. grievance" framework is
narrow and reductionist. Secondly, it is argued that its econometrics is unable to adequately
capture the sociology of conflict, which is the primary factor that informs all other dynamics
that may fuel a conflict. While acknowledging the relevance of the economic factor to the
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risk of conflict, critics of the "greed theory" argue that it still remains contentious as to how
this factor levels up with other risk factors like politics, culture, strategic factors of conflict
making, conflict duration, and the character of intrastate conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman
2003; Cramer 2002). Ballentine and Shelman (2003:6) argue that the "greed vs. grievance"
analytical framework imposes "an unnecessarily limiting dichotomy on what is, in reality, a
highly diverse, complex set of incentives and opportunity structures that vary across time and
location". They further argue that because this theory is a product of quantitative statistical
analyses, its propositions are necessarily "probabilistic" in terms of both motive and
opportunity for violent conflict; that while statistical methods may be useful to identify key
variables across a class of cases, at best they only generate broad correlations that illuminate
only part of the picture. They do not clarify "whether and how economic factors promote or
sustain particular arnled conflicts". They argue that to make such correlation requires deeper
and case specific empirical analyses comparing the applicability of the economic factor with
other factors (ibid p.5). Some authors argue that the dynamics of conflict are highly "fluid";
that motives and factors undergirding a conflict change and diversify the longer the conflict
lasts. This is identified to be the case with national liberation struggles which are said to
generate new grievances and incentives for predation as a result of protracted violence
(Sandole 1999; Stewart 2002). Other authors argue that the reality of "weak and failing state"
is another cause of violent conflicts (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 10). A state affected by
poor economic governance, large informal economy, weak army and incomplete control of
territory is posited to be more prone to the experience of rebellion, because the cost of
insurgency would be lower, and would-be challengers would see greater prospects of a
relatively rapid victory, combined with their easy access to income-generating resources and
capacities. Thus, weak state, rather than the physical presence of lootable resources, would be
a more direct factor behind a resource driven rebellion (Herbst 2000). Cramer (2002: 1854)
argues that in the greed theory "the encounter between methodological individualism and
rational choice is fraught" because the rational choice is ultimately a "myth". Although
choice and economic incentives may have relevance to incidence of conflict, such factors
would have been primarily moulded by "specific conditions and social and historical features
of change". And Homo Economicus has failed to relate to and properly engage these realities
in its conceptual framework (ibid p.1854, 1857).
In terms of the post-conflict peacebuilding project, two debates are most relevant to the issue
of new wars. The first concerns the role and impact of aid in context of conflict. According to
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An Agenda for Peace proposal, aid can and should also playa developmental role in addition
to the humanitarian purpose that it has served, particularly in conflict prevention and
resolution (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1995; Macrae 200 1:2). In this, the most pertinent question
has been the nature of aid impact on civil conflicts. The most influential work in this debate is
Mary Anderson's Do No Harm (1999). In this work she argues that aid given in context of
conflict involves collateral consequences from the purposes of both relief and conflict
resolution. First, aid does not only affect a conflict situation, but it is itself also affected by
the situation (Anderson 1999:37). The main reasons behind this are the realities that aid
resources are often stolen by combatants who use it to support their wars by buying weapons
with them or with revenues derived from them, and by using them to provide logistics for
their armies (ibid p.38). Aid can also support either "war economy" or "peace economy"
because. it often serves as a supply source to markets in conflict zones. When such markets
are used by needy and victim populations, they can be said to serve peace economy. But if
and when they are [also] used by war agents, it can conversely be said that they serve war
economy (ibid). Aid affects intergroup relationships. It can feed "tensions" under the
experience of discriminatory dispensation, while contributing to connectivity under the
experience of equitable dispensation (ibid). Aid can contribute to conflict when it meets
needs of civilians who may be partisans of conflict; and aid can legitimate an agenda of
conflict when it is channelled to war belligerents (ibid p.39). Second, aid administered in
context of conflict can become a source of livelihood for skilled and professional aid
workers, most of whom happen to be expatriates, who obtain their wages from it (ibid p.14).
Third, aid is also entangled in implicit ethical dilemmas. This is detectable in varied aspects
of aid enterprise: when arms are used to protect aid transporting convoy; in perceived
inequalities when expatriate aid workers are given preferential treatment over local aid
workers. For example, in crisis situations the safety of expatriate workers has taken
precedence over that of local aid workers; and the reality of "competition, disrespect or
mistrust" among aid agencies (ibid p.59).
In the light of these critical issues involved in the practice of aid politics, Anderson posited
her seminal notion of "do not harm" i.e. since the purpose of aid is "to save lives, reduce
human suffering, and support the pursuit of greater economic and social security in conflict
settings", aid should therefore be employed in a manner that "it does not cause harm" (ibid
p.67). This means that aid should be kept from practice, economic and political factors that
may fuel or contribute to conflict. This can be done by obtaining proper understanding of a
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conflict context, keeping aid from becoming a source of logistical support for belligerents and
partisans. Instead, aid should only serve needy and victim populations and be utilised to
enforce peace efforts (ibid p.59-67).
While the theoretical contribution of Do not harm is clear, its practical impact has been
questioned. Pearce (2005:45) observes that although it was initially a critique directed at the
aid work of Westem agencies, Do not harm "grew into a more wholesale attack on the global
humanitarian agenda of the post-conflict Cold War". Shannon (2004:36-37) posits that the
Do not harm debate "served to highlight the need for more systematic attention to the impact
of aid on conflict"; that this debate gave birth to the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
(PCIA) framework in the area of conflict resolution. This framework advocates a deeper
exploration of the relationship between local conflicts and the delivery of development and
humanitarian assistance. As such, the PCIA invites an active involvement of NGOs in the
conflict resolution discourse which until the end of the Cold War was a reserve of political
scientists and economists, while lawyers, diplomats and politicians shared the task of human
rights work (ibid). Through the Human Rights Declaration that emerged out of the 1993
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the PCIA was used to elevate a "rights based
approach" to the centre of the development agenda and work (ibid). Shannon (2004:36) posits
that besides the PCIA, the Do not harm debate also prompted the emergence of major policy
documents that went beyond impact assessment to setting out methodologies for assessing the
impact of an agency's work on conflict.
On the other hand, some authors have argued that the impact ofDo not harm has been limited
to evaluation, strategic, methodological, monitoring, planning, programming tools; that
although such tools may be useful for purposes of short-term and long-term review of
programmes, crises, sector management, and for project planning and participatory projects
planning, the debate has failed to produce paradigmatic shift at the broader level of aid
politics and thinking. Terlinden (2002) argues that this failure is evidenced in the lack of
adjustment in the mandate or core aims of the work of NGOs. Such an adjustment or change
would require a considerable expansion of NGO work in conflict prevention beyond mere
project based activities and perception of violent conflict (ibid). Hardt, (cited in Shannon
2004:37), argues that "do not harm has failed to develop a broader political perspective,
looking at the use of aid for promoting broader foreign policy, economic, cultural or military
objectives by actors in both donor and recipient countries".
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Another relevant debate between peacebuilding project and new wars concerns the
effectiveness of the agenda for peace itself. Pearce (2005:44) observes that concern over the
varied impact of aid on conflicts has divided the critics of the global peacebuilding agenda,
especially regarding the just cause intervention issue. While some have advocated
intervention as a way of preventing genocide, others have feared "the consequences of
legitimised international violations of national sovereignty". Others support intervention by
the UN, although not unilaterally (Pearce 2005:44). Pearce (2005:44) posits that since no
consensus could be built before on whether or not to establish "legitimate forms of
humanitarian intervention", the debate has been made harder by the contentious 2003 Iraq
intervention of the occidental coalition led by the US. Thus, Pearce (2005:45) argues, the
9/11 event of 2001 and the 2003 Iraq intervention set a new international context that
challenges the 1992 peacebuilding agenda launched by the UN Secretary-General. This is
because while the latter project has struggled to build "the foundations for global peace", the
synchrony between the former events raises new questions regarding the global peace agenda
(ibid). Pearce's assertion has been widely echoed and poses a concrete critique of An Agenda
for Peace vision and the prospects of its outcome. This critique is further explored in the
conclusion of this first part of the literature review.
2.4 NGOs as instruments of [international] development
The rise of NGOs in the international development scene has been generally traced back to
the 19th century non-profit based movements that lobbied on issues ranging from the plight of
slaves and slavery itself, women's suffrage, international law, and human rights issues
(Fischer 2006:4; Fitzduff2004:3). This first NGO generation was marked by the formation of
non-profit organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in
1864, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 1917, Save the Children Fund in
1917, Oxfam in 1942, who "saw themselves as primarily service oriented, dedicated to
addressing the consequences of war on the victims" (Fitzduff 2004:4). The second generation
came after WWII. Contrary to the previous generation, the work of this generation took a less
political line. It focused more on humanitarian work, dealing with "scarcity problems
previously handled by missionary societies" (Fitzduff 2004:4). Some of such organisations
include the Salvation ArnlY, the YMCA, and CARE (Fitzduff2006:4).
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From a longitudinal literary study analysing the operational and strategic aspects of NGO
work for half a century since 1950s, Hailey (1999:468) found significant changes over time.
He deduces four periodical shifts in the role of NGOs. From the colonial period 1950-1970s,
NGO activity was based on a "public-private" framework in which NGOs operated as
"welfare, humanitarian organisations"lo (ibid). In this period, thinking revolved around the
need to create co-operation between government and community as a strategy to support the
work of development since development was conceived as a "corporate task" (Schumacher
and McRobie, cited in Hailey 1999:472-3). This early engagement framework is affirmed by
most of the literature that has engaged with the work of NGOs in this period (see Fischer
2006; Fitzduff 2004; Richmond 2005). This corporate responsibility rationale seems to
correspond with the notion of "compensation" that was propounded by champions of
modernisation theory; that assistance to victims of modernisation would buffer the potential
of discontentment and revolutionary chaos (Larrain 1989; Macrae 2001) (see section 2.3, p.
9). Although Korten's (1990) critique of the level of development engagement in the colonial
period may be strategically valid in that it highlights its limitations for change at structural
and political levels and for sustainable development, it nevertheless confirms it. In his four
stages, generational scheme of development engagement, Korten observes that the first stage,
under which the colonial period falls, was confmed to "relief and welfare" activity. This
involved "relief efforts, feeding programs, hospital-based or dispensary-based curative care",
among others. Thus the problem being tackled was basic resource "shortage", whose
timeframe was "immediate" and short-tern1, the "scope" was "individual and family", and
NGOs were the "chief actors" operating as "logistics" managers (ibid p.117).
In the period 1970s-1980s, NGOs assumed a more independent, community oriented work.
They tended to distance themselves from state designed development programmes toward
programmes that were more rural and community integrated. In this phase, NGOs took a
more critical perspective "on the role and status of co-operatives" and obtained a greater
awareness of the potential of voluntary organisations and NGOs in development (Hailey
1999:473). Fitzduff (2004:4) remarks that in this period NGOs "adopted a more
confrontational approach to the occurrence of war and other ills of the world. After long and
difficult debate they decided they had to address not only the ravages of famines and war, but
10 Hailey (1999:468) remarks that generally "colonial authorities actively promoted voluntary organisations and
community-based institutions, whereas more progressive authorities even cooperated with indigenous NGGs,
self-help groups, village organisations and local co-operatives".
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also their causes through advocacy, campaigning, or lobbying" (ibid). In the following period
of 1980s and 1990s, "the decade of structural adjustment programmes, privatisation and
decentralisation, NGOs came full circle as they resumed a more public-private partnership
term of engagement" which they had pursued in the colonial period of 1950-1970 (Hailey
1999:468). They took a more centralised role of "resource provider". They became key
channels for international aid, took up a complementing role in public service delivery
alongside the state, they became prominent actors in the work of social change, in the
mobilisation of local resources and in the empowerment of local communities (Hailey
1999:475). However, whereas the "public-private partnership" between local colonial
authorities and NGOs was cordial, the relationship between independent state-governments
and NGOs seem to have been more politically antagonistic. This is because in the colonial
period, NGO work was conceived as complementary to public agenda, whereas in the period
1980s-1990s NGO work was conceived as opposite of failing public enterprise. This new
state-NGO relationship has been associated with neoliberalism. The neoliberallabel has been
widely used to describe the mainstream policy-making paradigm. Neoliberalism promotes a
free market and growth oriented economics. This theory has been generally promoted by
mainstream policy technocrats and thinkers and by leading international institutions such as
the World Bank, the IMF, various multilateral aid agencies and donors, and by the major
capitalist states of the North (Fowler 2000:64; Kamat 2003:70). In this framework, NGOs are
generally viewed as "apolitical, operational instruments" able to do and supplement what
incompetent and venal governments in the developing world are unable to do for the
advancement of the vision of economic development, democratisation and human rights
(Fowler 2000: vii; Howell 2002: 117). In the period 1980-1990s, this agenda was launched in
response to mounting economic crises, rising incidences of poverty and the grave social
morbidities caused by politico-military conflicts and instabilities and by natural disasters that
were affecting developing countries in particular (Commins 2000:71; Hillhorst 2003:218).
Hailey (1999:468, 478) argues that from 1990s onward, NGOs' strategic and operational
status is more ambivalent. While they have grown as major players in the development work,
they are exhibiting both a mainstream position and a leftist, community oriented stance. The
former position refers to the fact that they have continued to be key aid channels and because
of the international observer status they now have in the UN and in the international
development work. On the other hand, their leftist position is seen in the diversifying NGO
sector which includes labels such as "voluntary, self-help, community development, private
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voluntary organisations, non-profit organisations". Work being done by these diverse types of
NGOs ranges from isolated missions to "sophisticated programmes of mainstream
development" (Hailey 1999:469, 478). While Hailey's assessment is echoed all across the
board, it fails to clearly name the current frame of the debate between the neoliberal agenda
and more social development discourses. In the context of the peacebuilding agenda, NGOs
have found resource opportunity and political and structural spaces that have been catalysts in
expanding their relations (initially facilitated by the policy environment of the 1980s) with
international, multilateral and governmental agencies and with the private sector. Through
such relations, the status of NGOs' agency on the international development stage has been
boosted (Reimann 2006:46).
On the UN's An Agendafor Peace (1992) and An Agendafor Development (1995) proposals,
NGOs were welcomed as capable and viable partners in the work of peacebuilding,
reconstruction and development in post-conflict context. This invitation has been extended by
international institutions and liberal states of the North (Reimann 2006:46; Eric et aI2007:3).
Reimann (2006:45) has identified this platfonn as "top-down pro-NGO international norm".
He contrasts this view to the views that the expansion and ascendance of NGOs onto the
international stage are due to "bottom-up sociological, technological forces" and the reality of
state weakness (ibid). Respectively, sociological forces allude to popular reactions to socio-
economic factors such as democracy, development, education levels (Kaldor 2003), and
technological forces and state weakness refer to realities of revolution in information and
telecommunication technology, globalising activism, and the declining state (Richmond
2005). Reimann's insight can be observed in the policy and in the structural integration of
NGOs with international institutions, aid agencies, intergovernmental organisations and
individual governments, especially liberal states of the North. For example, the UN-NGO
"Arria Formula" relationship (Fitzduff 2004:6)11 signified by the establishment of the NGO
Working Group of the UN Security Council in 1995 with the aim of enabling an "off-the-
record dialogue" between NGO agents and council members (about 30) "to share
perspectives on issues of conflict around the world" (Fitzduff 2004:5). It is reported that
II The "Arria Formula" is a strategy of greater direct interaction between the UN and [grassroots] social agents
and agencies. It was developed and named after Diego Arria - a UN Security Council Ambassador from
Venezuela to the Balkans - in 1993. On the occasion of a Security Council members' visit to the Balkans, Arria
made the consultation more open and informal by including coffee drinking and the participation of a Bosnian
priest to express local, firsthand experience. Learning from that experience, UN consultations with governments
and NGOs were framed more informally. Various UN organs have adopted this formula in their diverse areas of
work (Fitzduff 2006:4).
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about 2,100 NGOs have now a "consultative status" within the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). ECOSOC is the UN organ that coordinates economic, social, and related
work of the 14 UN specialised agencies, functional commissions and five regional
commissions l2 . In 1997, former Secretary-General Kofi-Annan stated, "NGOs are now seen
as essential partners of the UN, not only in mobilising public opinion, but also in the process
of deliberation and policy formulation and even more important in the execution of policies,
in work on the ground" (see Fitzduff 2004:2; Shannon 2004:38).
The World Bank-NGO Committee that had been established as a global mechanism for
policy dialogue in 1983 was decentralised in 1995. Regional and national WB-NGO
Committees were established "to consolidate and extend dialogue on WB policies, programs
and loans" (Fitzduff2004:5). The Commission of the European Communities (EC) (2001:15)
designates NGOs as "implementing partners", alongside the European Community
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), of its development policies and programmes. The Ee's 2001
policy document also qualifies NGOs as paltners in development planning, and it reports that
65% of its total humanitarian assistance in the year 2000 was used to finance NGO projects,
with only 20% channelled through UN agencies and 15% through the Red Cross and other
international organisations (EC 2001: 15). Steen, (cited in Reimann 2006:53), points out that
in Sweden and Norway, for example, advocacy NGOs are often fully dependent on public
funding. Smillie and Helmich, (cited in Reimann 2006:53), report that since the end of the
Cold War to late 1990s, between 15 and 20% of the bilateral aid of the US, Canada,
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland and Nordic countries were channelled directly through
NGOs. This aid was aimed at the works of humanitarian relief, democratisation, civil society
development and advocacy (Carothers 1999:207-254; Reimann 2006:53). Fitzduff (2004:5)
notes that since the mid-1990s, there has been more intimate collaboration between British
government and international NGOs. This is observed, for example, in the regular
consultations there have been between the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and UK conflict and aid
agencies with the aim of sharing analyses and addressing issues of "common concern about
conflicts around the world" (Fitzduff2004:5).
12 United Nations Economic and Social Development Commission (ECOSOC), 2008, The non-governmental
organisations in consultative status, (!J.lli:2://www.un.org/ccosoc/newfunct/2008dcf.shtml accessed April 2(08).
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On the other hand, NGOs have also expanded relations with the private sector, from which
they have obtained increased resource opportunity to advance their work and status on the
global development stage. Keck and Sikkink (1998:98-99) observe that although NGOs have
received funding from the private sector in the past, they received an unprecedented level of
this funding during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Reimann (2006: 54) reports that NGOs
received about $1.1 billion in the period 1990-2000 from about 14 American private
foundations, including Alton Jones, Ford, Gates, Rockefeller, and Turner foundations.
Although they have been often characterised by a top-down approach, NGOs have also
continued to use leftist methods. They have engaged in grassroots and community
development activities, such as CIVIC and formal education, income-generation,
empowerment, peace culture, inter-religious dialogue, gender and women empowerment,
human rights promotion and monitoring, relief and reintegration of displaced peoples and
refugees, provision of psycho-social support to victims of war, action against human
trafficking, and partnership with community-based groups (CBOs) (Fischer 2006; van
Tongeren et al 2005). NGOs have further engaged in campaigns and lobbying at local and
international levels on crises management. For this, they have often organised into regional
and global networks to raise public awareness of issues and needs regarding various observed
crises (Serbin 2005). This engagement has been undergirded by a host of operational
narratives. NGOs have been deemed as an alternative to state-led development model, hence
the increasing level of aid channelling through them and trust that they can better respond to
socio-economic issues particularly in the developing world. This view is based on the
rationale that "NGOs are equipped with some better comparative advantages in peacebuilding
than states, such as their political independence, the flexibility of their mandates, their
impartiality, high standards of credibility" and the community-based nature of their activity
(Fischer. 2006:8, also see Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ottaway and Carothers 2000). It is
posited that NGO work is crucial for poverty alleviation and the creation of conditions for
industrialisation through community capacity building (Hilhorst 2003). Moreover, NGOs are
viewed as catalysts in the buffering of the effects of the process of economic reforms, in the
securing of adequate public service delivery and facilitation of successful political transitions
from authoritarianism to democratisation (Kaldor 2003). In the words of Edward and Hume
(1996), this glorification of civil society, in particular NGOs, in the post-Cold War vision and
work of development marks a "New Policy Agenda".
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Social-development-oriented discourses, on the other hand, have on varied fronts criticised
the NGOs' top-down platform and their claimed community-based engagement. Not least,
this criticism has partially emerged from within the NGO community itself, and its
fundamental premise is an unreserved opposition to the neoliberal doctrine. It is argued that
the neoliberal policy agenda and implementation are fundamentally flawed. On the one hand,
its market fundamentalist system encourages uneven development between the rich and the
poor. While the former are resourcefully equipped to grow richer within the system, the latter
are doomed to worsening poverty because of their disadvantaged footing (Fischer 1997:443).
On the other hand, the neoliberal focus on growth economics sets stage for an ecologically
unsustainable development because of over exploration of resources and the resultant
environmental pollution from expanding manufacturing (Sklair 2004:46). Hence the critique
that NGOs have consciously or unconsciously supported neoliberalism because of their
funding partnerships with institutions, donor agencies and states that have advocated and
served the neoliberal agenda (Kamat 2003 :67). Some authors have gone as far as dubbing
NGOs as new agents of political and economic imperialism (see Manji 2005; Petras and
Veltmeyer 1999). Thus, social-development-oriented discourses have argued that the role of
NGOs in development can be "valuable" only if it can be steered toward "alternative
development discourses and practices" (Fischer 1997:444). This perspective follows after the
social movements' pursuit for alternative discourses to the neoliberal free-market economics
and democratisation politics (Fischer 1997:441). Lofredo, (cited in Pearce 2000:20), argued
that the neoliberal development model simply amounts to a "sustainable [self] development"
of rich countries. Commins (2000:70, 72) cautioned that unless NGOs re-examine the nature
of the impact of their role in development and relief amidst the high platform and preference
they have obtained in structures of the world order, they risk to recede to mere "ladles in the
global soup kitchen" i.e. "the delivery agency" of "meagre comfort amidst harsh economic
changes and complex political emergencies in a world that is characterised by global
economic integration and the social exclusion of low-income communities, as well as
continuing and widespread levels of civil strife" (Commins 2000:70).
In counterargument to the mainstream's positive narrative that NGO work is community-
based, socially oriented discourses have criticised international or Northern NGOs (INGOs)
for paternalism in their relationship with local or Southern NGOS (LNGOs), and thereby of
lack of community accountability. The paternalism criticism refers to the nature of the
partnership between INGOs and LNGOs; that following the NGO ascension to high-platform,
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rent-seeking has taken precedence over effective engagement. That is, there has been greater
emphasis on technical capacity, including how to best meet donor project priorities and
timeframe and funding acquisition and accountability principles, over the politics
characterising such work (Hulme and Edwards 1997:20; Pearce 2000:22). On this count, as
primary intermediaries of donor funding 13 , INGOs have generally sought the homogenisation
of their LNGOs counterparts into their image in terms "outlook, identity and work" (Fowler
2000: 11) as shaped by donor agenda and priorities. For this reason, Taylor, (cited in Pearce
2000:28), argued that INGOs should shift the approach of their partnership with LNGOs
towards "internationalism". That is, "no international NGO would have a core identity in a
Northern country, but would be one part of an organisation, each of whose parts, wherever
located (whether North or South), would build up a strong and competent capacity of its own
and combine with the others to speak to the international organisation together" (ibid).
The donor-NGO relationship is considered crucial to the question of NGO accountability.
The fact that INGOs obtain their funding from stakeholders with specific interests and have
arguably subjected their strategic and operational activities to their reins, have been
considered as compromising factors. Kamat (2003:66) argues that NGOs have been more
accountable to the "interests of powerful states, national elites, and private capital" than to the
communities they serve. This reality makes the notion of NGO autonomy a "mirage".
Moreover, "NGOs' dependence on external funding and compliance with funding agency
targets raise doubts about whether their accountability lies with the people or with funding
agencies" (ibid). However, this line of argument has been countered before. Valderrama and
Coscio (1998:420) have argued that if NGOs shifted their funding source to self, internal
funding activities, such as economies of scale and finance, there is a risk that they could
digress from their original objectives of social-change. Nevertheless, the question of
accountability has spilled over onto the questions of "representation, participation and
legitimacy". The credibility of NGOs as a voice of civil society and poor communities in
international development circles, consultations, summits on human rights and advocacy,
economic and political conferences of Western countries such as the G8, in policy debates on
bilateral aid processes, has been questioned (Fowler 2000:35). This is because while they
have grown closer to such high entities, the genuineness and wholeness of their connection
IJ Pearce (2000:25) claims that by mid-1990s, official donors began to also channel funding directly to Southern
NGDs who as a result became gradually less dependent on Northern NGDs and began "to set their own agendas
and to develop research, policy and advocacy capacities". However, she posits that this shift was interfered with
by protest from British INGDs.
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with intended beneficiaries and their fundamental human rights have increasingly been
questioned. This factor has consequentially put into question their legitimacy to represent and
speak on behalf of the poor (ibid p.39).
Mainstream promotion of NGOs over weak states has also been criticised. Goodhand and
Chamberlain, (cited in Pearce 2000:29), observe that in taking up certain state
responsibilities, NGOs run the risk of falling in the grip of particular interest groups in the
process of negotiating for space to fulfil such tasks with the strongmen in a society. From
empirical studies conducted in Uganda and Zambia, respectively, Cannon (1996) and Collier
(1996) agreed that the fact that NGOs may have taken up certain state responsibilities should
not mean that the state should have a lesser role in the provision of public goods. Rather, it
should mean that NGOs may have the significant role of complementing state work,
particularly by alerting it to issues and social situations that it may be oblivious about.
Whaites (1998:125-130) has argued that the theoretical framework that aid agencies and
development practitioners have obtained from liberal philosophers of civil society, such as de
Tocqueville, of strengthening civil society and not the state is not completely adequate for the
current situation of the South. This is because the problem being faced in the South is the
very opposite of the problem that such thinkers were addressing in the North. While the
Occident was threatened by the problem of excessive state power, the South is instead
confronted with the problem of extreme state weakness. Therefore, neglecting the state and
focusing on strengthening civil society alone has the risk of rendering the state hostage to the
most powerful social group in a society, which can subsequently create a major obstacle to
the process of development (ibid). In response, Pearce (2000:31) argues that although there
may be evidence to support Whaites' argument l4, the main issue at stake however relates
more to state "capacity to develop the ability to distance itself from dominant groups" rather
than about state strength or weakness.
NGO actors themselves have understood their role in development as a third way between
undependable and authoritarian statism and the unrestrained market capitalism that has
14 Petras and Veltmeyer (200 I: 131-132) argue that during 1980s-1990s, NGOs were prominent players in
"democratic transitions" from old regimes in various countries such as Chile, Philippines, South Korea. They
used their "grass roots rhetoric, organisational resources and status as democratic human rights advocates to
channel popular support behind politicians and parties". However, their action was limited to a transition that
involved "legal-political reforms, but not socio-economic changes" (ibid).
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caused the deterioration of the welfare of many peoples and communities around the world.
This perspective has been named NGOs' "moral high ground" (Holloway 1999:21). At the
same time, however, NGOs have also expressed concern about the challenge to clarify their
policy stance within the international political economic regime. In the first international
NGO conference organised in 1992 under the theme NGOs and Development, NGO
stakeholders reflected on the tensions that NGOs' recent rise on the international
development stage was creating within the development NGO community. Warnings were
made about the gains as well as costs this new status could bring. The following was stated in
the final report of the conference,
Increasing interest and support for NGOs among official donor agencies may create a
predisposition, or foster a shift, towards operational and organisational expansion. These
incentives need to be treated cautiously, because decisions to expand with official finance
may have various unwelcome consequences: for example, they may close off potential
courses of action; or make NGOs feel more accountable to their official donors than to their
intended beneficiaries; or imply support for policies of wholesale economic Iiberalisation.
(Hulme and Edwards 1997: 20)
It was against this background that Lofredo and Commins' critique and caution were
respectively made. Lofredo criticised the neoliberal system of simply advancing the
"sustainable [self] development" of rich countries; meaning that Hulme and Edwards' caution
went unheeded (Pearce 2000:20). And Commins (2000) cautioned about the risk of NGOs
becoming mere "ladles in the global soup kitchen", particularly because they were now
participating in the implementation of social safety-net programmes without however actively
engaging with the neoliberal reform policies contributing to such crises in the first place.
The second international NGO conference was realised in 1994 under the theme NGOs and
Development: Performance and Accountability in the New World Order. The dominant point
in this round was the call for NGOs "to return to their original roots" if they were to have a
meaningful impact on the eradication of mass poverty (Pearce 2000:22). However, Pearce
(2000:23) argues, this call was buried by a drive toward "professionalism". As a participant
in that conference, Pearce argues that a split occurred during discussions between two broad
camps. The majority emphasised the need for NGOs to emancipate technically according to
the new [neoliberal] economic order if they were to remain relevant. This would involve
building more capacity institutionally, in donor accountability, and in the ability to measure
development through social indicators. Conversely, the minority camp emphasised the need
"to get the politics right first and resist donor-driven agendas if these served only to
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bureaucratise and depoliticise NGOs". Pearce (2000:23) argues that NGOs lost the
opportunity to develop their own critique of neoliberalism because the majority view of
"professionalism" prevailed, and because the debate was posed in terms of "technical
agendas versus politics" instead of a fusion of the two.
The theme of the third conference was NGOs in a Global Future realised in 1999. Debate at
this third round is considered to have been a continuum from the second round. On the table
remained the call for NGOs to return to their roots "as promoters of social change and of non-
market values of co-operation, non-violence, and respect for human rights and democratic
processes, and to make these the bottom line in decision over economics and the
environment, social policy, and politics" (Pearce 2000:24). However, Wallace (1999:2)
remarks, given the split in perspective since the second round, this round did not produce
much in terms of a new way forward. Pearce (2000:24) posits that despite the wide
attendance, the abovementioned ideas were not really engaged. Nevertheless, the lack of
emergence of a clear future direction from this conference clarifies "the parameters of
debate" within the development NGO community (i.e. continued search for their self-
redefinition) (Pearce 2000:24).
2.5 Conclusion: NGOs and the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Agenda
While it is hardly feasible to mathematically measure the outcome of the peacebuilding
agenda, it seems nevertheless relevant and useful to conclude this systemic review with the
major critical issues being raised about the prospects of the agenda and its relationship with
the development role of NGOs. The International Peace Academy (WSp)15 report of 2004
entitled Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited, posits that the difficulty of evaluating the
outcome of the peacebuilding agenda is owed to the lack of consensus about the definition
and the ultimate goals of the agenda, and because its long-term process would pervade the
limited scope of any analysis (Tschirgi 2004:10)16. For what it is worth, however, the WSP
15 The International Peace Academy (WSP) is an international research institute that engages in "Security-
Development Nexus Program", whose aim is to contribute to "a better understanding of the linkages between
security and development strategies in conflict management". Through its research projects, conferences and
publications, the program seeks to provide concrete advice to the UN system and the broader international
community so that they may engage more effectively in the agenda and work of sustainable development
(Tschirgi 2004).
16 Nec1ii Tschirgi is the Vice-President of the WSP and Director of the Security-Development Nexus Program.
He is also the author of the 2004 report.
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indicates that two major strands of finding have emerged from the few evaluative studies that
have been attempted. One is the indication that despite the recorded decrease in the number
of violent conflicts since the end of the Cold War, recidivism to war is a strong fact in most
post-conflict countries. Two, end of conflict has not necessarily translated into peacebuilding
in most cases, because peace agreements have widely failed to lead to the establishment of
"structural factors lying at the source of the original conflict...and [such factors] continue to
fester" (Tschirgi 2004: 10). These findings are mostly associated with conflict because
throughout the 1990s the UN's peacebuilding work was dominated by peacekeeping
operations (Ibid p.3). In such operations, NGOs engaged in early warning conflict prevention
activities and preventive diplomacy, and in "facilitation of dialogue workshops and
mediation, negotiations, networking and initiatives for cross-cultural understanding and
relationship-building" (Fischer 2006:5).
One critical Issue confronting the peacebuilding agenda is the lack of cohesion in the
international response to the post-conflict reconstruction process. According to the WSP
(Tschirgi 2004:5-7), while the humanitarian and peacekeeping aspects were institutionally,
politically and conceptually coherent, the post-conflict reconstruction aspect "was and still
remains an institutional orphan". Each international actor's approach has been particular. The
WSP (Tschirgi 2004:5) posits that this is because the post-conflict reconstruction element has
been considered a "temporary stage in the unilinear transition from war to peace and
considered as part of the relief-development continuum". As such, despite sharing the broader
neoliberal paradigm and major policy principles like human security, democratisation, and
fundamental human rights (see section 2.4), international development compacts and
governments have generally pursued individual agendas and specific elements of response 17 .
The WSP (Tschirgi 2004:6-8) posits that this is the factor underlying the ongoing realities of
a lack of policy coherence and the consequential lack of donor funding alignment (including
quantity shortage and delivery sequence), as well as the factor that is making international
17 For example, the US has engaged through its USAID based Office and Transition and Initiatives (OTI)
created in 1994; the UK through its Department for International Development (DFID) based Conflict and
Human Affairs Department (CHAD) created in 1997; Canada through its Department of Foreign Affairs and
Canadian Aid Agency (CIDA) based Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative created in 1996; the Netherlands'
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Directorate of Crisis Management and International Assistance
(DCH) in 1996; The UNDP formed the Emergence Response Division (ERD) in 1995; the World Bank
established a Post-Conflict Unit in 1997. The OECD DAC guidelines (2001) have been major informative
frameworks for most of the European sub-country schemes (Tschirgi 2004:6-7).
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actors rely mostly on NGO agency for the implementation of their programmes and activities
on the ground in the complex emergence situations (Tschirgi 2004:6-8).
In this juncture, NGO praxis has been criticised for being top-down in approach, and the
conflict resolution and management approach being promoted by international agents as
being exc1usivist. Pearce (2005:46-48) argues that international donors have used NGOs and
civil society as "technical instruments and projects for externally driven agenda". As a result,
rather than helping, often NGOs and civil society have caused more harm. Therefore, a
strategic way forward might be to emancipate the "local and weaker voices" both into the
peacebuilding approach and into the public sphere (Pearce 2005:46-48). However, Pearce's
proposition is not new. It has been part of the NGO repertoire for a while. It goes back to
Coombs' (1980) seminal concept of integrated development; Korten's (1980) notion of
learning process; Uppoft's (1986: 195) insight that the best practice for institutional
development should be to seek to make their contributions "additive rather than substitutive
or subtractive", which nearly a decade later Edwards (1994: 67-70) developed into the
concept of "enabling state" - capturing the need to develop public administration alongside
civil society. Instead, the problem has been the failure by international actors to apply such
knowledge in practice. For this reason, Stiefel (1999: 16-19) argues that one way of reforming
operational practice would be to promote more in-depth principles such as the transfer of
project control from donors to local, recipient agents beyond just participation; and the
criteria for measuring success should supersede "cost-efficiency" to "indirect social impact of
interventions"18.
The concept of "peacebuilding from below" emerged as a counter-discourse in the field of
conflict resolution in the 1990s (Pearce 2005:42). This praxis discourse was significantly
influenced by John Lederach's seminal work Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in
Divided Societies (1997). In this work, Lederach (1997) argued for "multi-track and multi-
dimensional" (including all levels of society) approaches to peacebuilding practice, as well as
the need for cultural, structural, personal and relational changes within war-tom societies.
Pearce (2005:42) observes that the "peacebuilding from below" discourse was well received
18 [t is to note that some considerably positive steps have been taken by the United Nations, donor governments,
regional organisations, international NGOs and other international actors in documenting knowledge obtained
from experience on the ground in order to inform future endeavours (Tschirgi 2004: 16).
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because the environment into which it emerged was opportune, filled with failed "elite led
negotiations between unarmed actors to deliver peace in its broadest sense to the majority".
Another critical issue confronting the peacebuilding agenda is the neoliberal content. Some
critics argue that the merger of the agenda with the assumption that neoliberalism can bring
about prosperity to all humanity is dangerous because neoliberalism has often contradicted
and militated against needs and priorities of post-conflict reconstruction (Bendana 2003;
Boyce 1996; Date-Bah 2003; Desoto and Castillo 1994; Pearce 2005). Besides the lack of
recognition of these contradictions in intemational development circles, this critique is
mainly based on the experienced absence of an "economics of peace" (global
welfare/development) under the neoliberal regime (Pearce 2005:47). As a result, some have
questioned the legitimacy of the peacebuilding agenda itself in the first place. It has been
argued that this agenda was flawed from the beginning because it was based on the erroneous
assumption that the rich countries of the global north are "neutral" actors who would deliver
policy and finance to end civil wars in the global south and to assist them in post-conflict
reconstruction and development (Pearce 2005; Duffield 1994). This shows an initial failure to
engage the reality of behind the scenes involvement of northern countries in many such
conflicts, and the fact that many of the protracted conflicts today derive from proxy-wars that
northern powers engineered in the Third World during the Cold War regime (Macrae 2001;
Pearce 2005). Furthermore, the peacebuilding agenda has been met with growing "mistrust"
because of the problematic identified in the notion of "international community" (Pearce
2005:47-48). The fact that the international community (multilateral and bilateral actors
designated as the agenda's prime agents) consists of actors with different levels of "power
and wealth, goals, and values" is seen as the reason behind the many contradictions and
inconsistencies that the peacebuilding process has had. For example, the report of the
international workshop of the [Canadian] International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) realised in 2002 to mark the lOth anniversary of An Agenda for Peace was tellingly
themed What Kind ofPeace, Whose Peace and Peace for Whom? The report summarised that
the real beneficiaries of the peacebuilding programmes being conducted across the world are
not the poor from the complex emergence situations, but the network of local, national elites
and international actors, and institutions of the peacebuilding process themselves (Bendana
2003). Duffield (1999, 2001, 2002, 2005) has argued that the primary concern of the
international community in conflict resolution is the security of their own borderlands from
the instability of the violent conflicts in the South. Thus, humanitarian and development
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assistance have not been dispensed in a manner they can contribute to the sustainable
recovery and progress that countries in the South need to overcome the devastation of wars.
Instead, through the new framework of "public-private partnership", metropolitan states have
used aid as a political leverage to globalise the liberal system i.e. exercise "global
governance", and to accumulate wealth from the South through the private sector. The latter
is being facilitated by institutional and policy reforms, the introduction of private sector
management techniques into public administration, and "aid practice networks that bring
together donor governments, UN agencies, NGOs, private companies". He calls this
manoeuvre the "secularisation of development" (Duffield 2002: 1050-63).
Lastly, the peacebuilding agenda is also confronted by the post 9/11 2001 factor. The WSP
(Tschirgi 2004: ii) posits that since the 9/11 event, the peacebuilding agenda has been
overshadowed by a new discourse on "nation-building, regime change and stabilisation and
reconstruction". This discourse is being driven by "certain powerful states" to guarantee that
their security is not affected by the consequences of the instability of "weak and failing
states". The WSP (Tschirgi 2004: ii) posits that the premise of this discourse undermines the
premise of the peacebuilding agenda. While the latter is about security "nurtured internally
through patient, flexible, responsive strategies that are in tune with domestic political
realities", the former is an imposition driven by powerful "external concerns" alone.
Therefore, the challenge for the peacebuilding agenda now is to resist against being replaced
by "the stabilisation agenda of certain powerful states" (Tschirgi 2004: ii). Pearce (2005:44)
concurs that the new post 9/11 context is not "favourable" for the peacebuilding agenda; that
this is a critical phase for the agenda, and concern and questions are being raised about whose
interests are really at stake. For some authors, however, the post 9/11 context has helped to
put the issue of fragile state back on the map, which until 9/11 was only engaged by
humanitarian organisations (Burke 2006). Other authors, however, question the link between
fragile state and security. They argue that this connection elevates security concern over
development; it conditions aid to security over development concerns. As such, this
connection makes excuse for the cutting down of aid assistance, overlooking real causes of
poverty, and it can even interfere with NGO work (Matthews 2002; Woodward 2002).
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CHAPTER THREE
NGOs AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN ANGOLA
3. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to identify the role that NGOs are being assigned in the process of
post-conflict reconstmction in Angola following the end of the three decade civil war in
2002. The survey is based on the review of relevant NGO policies in Angola, international
assistance policies and behaviours, and most relevant academic literature and news-events.
The objective is to test the perception of the current study that space for NGO contribution to
the reconstmction process is dwindling since the state is becoming the primary donor-partner
over NGOs, and on account of the exclusivist model of policy and law-making that the
Angolan state seems to be practicing and its resultant pressure on NGO activity in the
country.
3.1 Background of NGO activity in Angola
The background of NGO activity in Angola differs in many respects from the international
picture captured in the first part of the review. In Angola, NGOs have evolved concurrently
with the larger civil society. This evolvement is however still embryonic because of the
political legacy that has historically confronted civil society organisation in the country.
Under the Portuguese colonial regime that lasted until 1975, the only form of civil
organisation authorised was religion. A similarly oppressive regime was continued by the
independent Marxist government of Angola until late 1980s. This included the outlawing of
civil assembly and association and any forn1 of democratic politics. Only local NGOs
(LNGOs) that were created as social branches of the mling party were allowed to operate
(Faria 2003; Tevdten 1997:46). Any other form ofNGO, local or international, that may have
been active during this period would have had a passive political policy. Its activity would
have been limited to basic needs assistance to subsistence farmers and shanty dwellers in
mral areas, and to war victims and displaced populations (Faria 2003)19.
19 The only NGOs that were allowed to operate in the country besides the party created NGOs were a few
church-based development organisations, such as Caritas Angola and the Conselho de OrganizQI;:oes
Evangelicas de Angola. But the activity scope of such organisations was limited to basic needs assistance to
poor communities. Throughout this period churches did not generally dare to challenge the regime (Best
1979:139,144).
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With the politico-ideological shift that occurred in the country in 1990 from Marxist-
Leninism and one-party system to social-democracy and multipartyism, civil society and
NGOs could emerge following the ratification of the Association Law 14/91 (Comerford
2006; Faria 2003). While LNGOs were initially state-linked, increasingly, not least because
of partnerships they came to entertain with international NGOs (INGOs) and donor agencies,
many LNGOs have grown independent from the State (Faria 2003; Hodges 2004:88).
According to the latest official census published by the Technical Unit for the Coordination
ofHumanitarian Assistance (UTCAH 2007)2(\ 320 NGOs are currently operating in Angola,
of which 200 are local and 120 are international. However, given the exploding trend ofNGO
emergence and the complex legalisation process existing in the country, there could be a
slightly higher number of actively engaged LNGOs than the officially recorded.
With the change of the political system in the early 1990s, the relatively more democratic
environment, and the influential presence of INGOs, NGO activity has been taking an
increasingly more active and political outlook. Besides humanitarian and relief projects, both
LNGOs and INGOs have been more vocal on issues of human rights, governance, public
finance, accountability, and democratisation. LNGOs' most remarkable political action so far
was the integral role they played in the civil campaign for peace in 1999-2002 under the
leadership of the umbrella church organisation designated as Inter-Ecclesial Commission for
Peace in Angola (COIEPA). Civil society demanded both the ruling party and the then armed
opposition movement to put an end to the three decade conflict that was increasingly
destroying the country (Comerford 2006; Faria 2003; Teka 2006).
However, as many studies and reports have recorded, NGO activity has continued to
experience serious political challenges in the post-conflict era that ushered with the end of the
conflict in 2002. The main factor behind such challenges has been the generally unclear and
often ambivalent government behaviour toward NGO activity in the country, which has
varied across "alignment, co-option or rivalry" (Chatham 2005:21). This can be exemplified
in the new Association Law 84/02 that became effective in 2004. While building on onto the
same bureaucratism of the previous law, the new law also does away with many of the
freedoms provisioned in the former. It defines NGOs only as service organisations that
intervene in basic social assistance. It outlaws their involvement in political and partisan
20 UTCAH is the public organ charged with the legal registration and coordination of civil organisations and
their activities in Angola, and it falls under the Angolan Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration.
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activity, it requires NGOs to have proof of sufficient funding in order to be legal actors, and it
requires NGOs to report regularly about their activities to UTCAH (Amundsen and Abreu
2006:7; Chatham 2005:23). At the same time, relationship between NGOs and various state
organs has varied from favourable to antagonistic. For example, there was a six month long
spat between the UTCAH and NGOs that spilled from 2006 over to 2007. The General
Director of UTCAH threatened to purge both LNGOs and INGOs that were breaking the law
(Law 84/02) and were mobilising masses against the government under the pretence of
human rights work. In the meantime, the government had already banned a human rights
organisation, Mpalabanda Associas;iio Civica, in the enclave province of Cabinda. The
Cabinda Provincial Court had ruled that Mpalabanda was carrying out "political activities
rather than being a civil society organisation,,2!.
Conversely, the Angolan Interior Ministry has worked closely with NGOs on human rights
issues (Amundsen and Abreu 2006: 12). Another example is the invitation the parliament
opened to NGOs to participate in the debate on the drafting of the Lei Terra (Land Law)
(Shaxson et al 2008:58). A subtler feature of government behaviour towards NGOs is what
Amundsen and Abreu (2006:7) have called "a communist and corporatist" strategy. The
government has used party affiliated mass organisations to corral the people behind it and the
ruling party in order to boost its juridical legitimacy. Most of these organisations date back to
the one-party regime when only the ruling party-based people organisations were lawful.
These organisations were used for political indoctrination of the masses and party
propaganda. They include Oganizas;iio da Mulher Angolana (OMA), Juventude do MPLA
(JMPLA), and the Organizac;iio dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto (OPA)22 (Faria 2003; Tevdten
1997). Recently, the government has developed new corporatist tools like the President's
Fundas;iio Eduardo dos Santos (FESA) and the first lady's Fundo de Solidariedade Social
(Lwiny). Through these social instruments, even NGO leaders are being co-opted into the
government partisanship by means of "clientelism" i.e. bribery (Amundsen and Abreu 2006;
Messiant 200 I). Interestingly enough, the two presidential NGOs which are supposed to be
civil foundations are not enlisted in the registry and directory of UTCAH.
21 The author followed these developments closely through Angolan Public and Independent media, and out of it
produced an Op-Ed in 2007 under the title "Whose democracy is Democracy?"
22 Respectively, Organisation of the Angolan Woman, Youth of the MPLA (the ruling party), Organisation of
the Disciples of Agostinho Neto (MPLA and Angola's first president).
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Besides government apathy, NGOs are not generally the most credible civil society
organisation in the country; the church owns this credential. Although recognised as
important actors in the post-conflict reconstruction and development process by many,
especially in remote areas and at local government levels, NGOs have also been associated
with bourgeoisie. It has been observed that NGOs, especially INGOs, have concentrated their
activities mostly in urban areas, and that careerism rather than service has dominated the
work ethics of their hard currency earning professionals. This is exacerbated by the
perception of their being closer and more accountable to donors than to communities (Vines
et al 2005:21-26; Shaxson et al 2008:56-57). Moreover, NGOs and civil society have also
been challenged by their limited political leverage. This is because their activities have been
dominantly humanitarian, "project limited, excessive concern to meet members' interests,
and weak capacity to negotiate with state and donors" (Pacheco 2002:61-63).
3.2 Aid as a measure of international policy for NGO activity in Angola
The most telling feature of the international policy for NGO activity III Angola since
independence is the aid instrument. On the early phase of the aid doctrine, which in the first
part of the review is identified to have been between 1940s and 1970s (section 3p.9), Angola
was not yet an independent state. It was still under Portuguese colonialism until 1975. As an
independent state, Angola only became part of the aid dispensationalism at the second and
third phases, respectively identified to have been between 1970s-1980s and from 1990s to
date. In the second phase, Angola was not on the scheme of the capitalist bloc. It rather
received the bulk of its aid from former communist allies, mainly, the USSR and Cuba and
other Eastern Bloc countries. Apart from some UN humanitarian assistance, the most known
exception of Western assistance to Angola was Sweden. As already observed, there were
barely any INGOs in Angola during that period (Tevdten 2002: 12; UN 2003:85). As such,
Angola did not undergo World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes. It was not
until the fall of communism and Angola's politico-ideological shift to social democracy that
the country acceded to the third stage of the aid dispensation. Since then, Angola began to
receive less aid from the Soviet Bloc and more aid from industrialised Western countries. The
main bilateral donor-countries to Angola since then have been the US, Norway, the UK,
Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The main multilateral donors have been the EU, the UN
and lately also the World Bank (Tevdten 2002: 12; UN 2003:85; USAID 2008/5).
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In 1992, Angola had its first democratic elections following the Bicesse Peace Agreement
that the ruling party and the former arn1ed opposition had signed. But this process failed to
deliver stable peace and reconciliation as the electoral outcome was contested23 . This led to
full resumption of war with a respite in 1994 for new peace talks - the Lusaka Talks (Adams
1996:3). Due to failures in the implementation of accords, the Lusaka Protocol collapsed and
war resumed from 1998 until 2002 (Hodges 2004: 16). Substantial bilateral and multilateral
development aid was channelled from the West to Angola through the UN to support the
electoral process in 1992 (Tevdten 2002:13; UN 2003:86). With the resumption of war,
however, the content of the aid was redirected to humanitarian assistance. As a result, a large
number of NGOs eventually flooded the country (Tevdten 2002: 12). With the signing of the
Lusaka Protocol in 1994, aid once again began to be channelled through the government
towards a "rehabilitation and recovery" agenda (Tevdten 2002: 13; UN 2003:86). A
remarkable artefact of this shift was the September 1995 Brussels round table between the
Angolan Government and donors (UNDP and the European Commission). From this round,
$900 million were pledged to sponsor an integrated, community-level programme, the
Programa de Reabilitar;Cio Comunitaria e de Reconstrur;Cio Nacional (PRC) (Cain 2002:7;
Tevdten 2002: 13; UN 2003:86). With the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol in 1998 and the
full resumption of war, aid was again redirected toward humanitarian crisis. Most multilateral
assistance was submitted under the coordination of the UN Humanitarian Assistance Agency
(UCHA), later renamed Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA).
Bilateral aid was also channelled through the UN and INGOs. Only a few donors like the US
and the EC continued to channel some assistance to the GoA toward "rehabilitation and
development" (UN 2003:93; UNDP 2002). Important is the issue of donor fatigue which
significantly decreased aid size during this period (Hodges 2002:40-41) following the 1990s
international trend of declining aid package (see section 2.3). Also, donor policy was justified
by the rationale that the GoA was a "fragile partner" i.e. one lacking political "commitment"
and governance and institutional "capacity" to pursue a "pro-poor" agenda and policies
(Hodges 2002:40-41; UN 2003 :92; World Bank 1998).
23 In August 1992 the People's Republic of Angola was renamed "Republic of Angola". Polling took place on
29-30 September 1992 and both the legislative and presidential results were published on 17 October 1992 by
the UN Electoral Commission. The ruling party won 53.74% of the legislative vote against 34.1% of the main
opposition (formal armed movement); and the ruling pal1y's candidate won 49.57% of the presidential vote
against 40.07% of the opposition's candidate. Since none could gather 50% of the total vote, the two
presidential candidates had to go for a run-off according to the country's electoral law. The opposition protested
that there had been "widespread systematic vote irregularity and fraud" and armed conflict resumed
subsequently (Adams 1996:3).
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However, from the mid-2000s, donor policies and projects have pointed toward a new
significant shift in relations between donors, the government, NGOs and the private sector.
This shift is framed in terms of the standard model of "public-private partnership" whereby
the government is placed as the central development agent, although without the exclusion of
NGOs and the larger civil society and the private sector. And aid is ascribed the double
function of relief and development. It is this shifting policy gear that seems to underline a
rising concern from some NGO circles that the responsibility of the country's reconstruction
is being optimistically centralised on the shoulders of the State. In this conjuncture, the
agency of LNGOs is facing uncertainty about the future due partially to INGOs' growing
reluctance to avail them funding. However, the agency of both LNGOs and INGOs is
threatened by diminishing funding and legal pressure from the government (Chatham
2005:21; DWA 2006a).
Two factors have defined the centrality of the government in the new "public-private
partnership" framework, namely, the government's development plans and their donor
sponsorship. Since 2002, government has issued four such plans designed according to the
donor principle of [country] Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), which has been widely
perceived as a new form of structural adjustment programme (Lopes 2008). Significantly, in
the government's PRSPs, NGOs are posited as an integral part of the necessary collective
agency alongside the government, donors, the private sector and the general public in the
achievement of the goals of poverty eradication and national development (GoA 2004: 15-16;
2005:45).
Besides the EC, the US is the only major donor that has continued to avail bilateral aid for
"rehabilitation and recovery" to Angola since mid-1990s, while most donor countries and
international institutions had shifted their aid toward humanitarian crisis only. This US policy
has expanded since the end of the war in 2002. Through USAID-Angola and its Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI), the US has set out a strategic framework of cooperation with
Angola moulded by the US policy of "fragile state,,24. This policy premises that the framing
of USAID projects for Angola must be placed within the framework of the government's
24 This is a post 9/11 addition to the US foreign policy whose two earlier pillars were "defence and diplomacy".
The "fragile state" pillar posits that the security of the US and of the larger international community is
intrinsically linked to development. The underdevelopment that is ravaging the world creates an opportune
environment for the operation of "destabil isi ng forces manifesting on the dark side of globalisation and pose a
different kind of national security challenge". To deal with underdevelopment, the key is to ensure that "fragile,
failing states" are back on their feet to meeting the needs and goals of development (USAID 2005b:7-9).
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development agenda, and they should be implemented in collaboration with the government,
civil society and the private sector. The three foci of the USAID strategy for Angola since
2002 have been: strengthening of the institutional capacity of the public sector and the state,
the development of Angola's private sector towards employment creation in a troika alliance
with the government and business, and contribution to the fair distribution of national
resources through participation in service delivery in collaboration with the state and NGOs
and the larger civil society (Parker et al 2004; USAID 2005).
The new EC-Angola "Country Strategy Paper for 2008-2013"25 involves three mam
objectives: (i) "to continue to enhance governance and bolster economic and institutional
reform as a first priority area"; (ii) to assist Angola to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) through involvement in "human and social development" activities; and (iii)
to invest in the country's "rural, agriculture and food security development" given that a vast
majority of the Angolan population subsist on agriculture and are confronted with serious
food insecurity. However, the EU and EC also envisage supporting "the water sector, trade,
Non-state actors and biodiversity management" (ibid). But since late 1990s, UK, Netherlands
and Sweden have continued channelling their bilateral aid for Angola through UN agencies
and INGOs (Vines 2006; UN 2003:92), while Norway has more or less split the channelling
of its assistance between the government and CSOs (Isaksen et al 2006; NPA 2007).
The international community's policy for Angola is shifting despite its earlier rejection of the
government's request for a second donor conference for Angola in the aftermath of the war.
The government sought for a discussion on possibilities of funding Angola's reconstruction
(Chatham 2005a:43). As observed earlier, the international community argued that the GoA
lacked commitment and capacity to pursue pro-poor policies (Hodges 2002:40-41; UN
2003:92). Thus, the governnlent turned east to China from which it obtained a $2billion loan
in September 2004, giving China a growing geopolitical advantage in the country. This was
partially the motivation behind the change of policy among Western donors, coupled with
security concerns (Africa Confidential 2004:7; Aguilar 2005:2; Chatham 2005:43)26. This is
25http://cc.curopa.cu/dcvJ;.lopmcl1tfgeOgiMhicnl!rcgio.IJsCill!.IJJxies/countries!countrv proli_le.~frn?cid=ao&tvpc""-s
hort&lng=en (EU Foreign Office Website: accessed 16/06/08)
26 China's repayment terms seem considerably flexible: a span of twelve years including grace period. However,
it is still disputable whether its deal is really better than Western donors' (Africa Confidential 2004:7; Aguilar
2005:2; Chatham 2005:43). But appealing to the GoA were China's non-interference and non-intervention
African Policy principles (CAPP 2006).
42
not least confirmed by the high donor forum realised in Paris in March 2005, although
Angola was not an official participant, whose outcome was expressed on the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual
Accountability (2005). Both donors and partners (recipient countries) pledged to greater
integration and coordination between donor projects, local PRSPs and MDGs, synchronised
aid delivery, and accountability between the parties.
After the war, the UN, through its Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002 (CAP 2002),
resuscitated into the donor policy the need to place the government as the leading player in
Angola's reconstruction and development. This appeal "explicitly [re]27 introduced the
paradigm of a partnership in support of the realisation of rights as the foundation for
humanitarian action. This highlighted the leading responsibility of the government, while
appealing to donors for complementary support... the role of external partners, both financial
donors and the international agencies and NGOs involved in delivering humanitarian relief,
was to complement the actions taken by Government" (UN 2003:84-85). The UN adapted the
CAP 2002 after the government's 2003-2004 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (1-
PRSP) as framework for UN intervention in Angola during 2004. For the period 2005-2008,
UN intervention in the country has been framed in the 2005-2008 mid-term UN Development
Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2005/2008:5-6)28. This framework is adapted to the ten
development priority areas established in the government's 2005-2008 mid-term PRSp29 ,
while awaiting the issuing of government's 2009-2025 long-term plan so that it can also
develop a long-term UNDAF (UNDAF 2005/2008:7-8). Thus, as the representative UN
system in Angola, UNDAF's goal is to assist the country's reconstruction and development
agenda by supporting "efforts of the government, and the Angolan society at large" in
27 This partnership paradigm was fundamental in the UN's peace agenda from the beginning; later it was also
adopted by the OECD/DAC strategy paper (1996), only to be abandoned, with regard to Angola, at the failure of
the Lusaka Protocol in 1998 (see sections 2.11, 2.1.2; 2.4; 2.5).
28 UNDAF is "a common planning framework", one of the two instruments alongside Common Country
Assessment (CCA), that resulted from the 1997 UN reform "to guide UN agencies at country level towards a set
ofjointly agreed outcomes ... it is also a tool for strengthening external partnerships in the support of national
priorities" (UNDAF 2005/2008 :6-7).
29 The government's ten priority areas are reintegration of IDPs, refugees, demobilised soldiers to their areas of
origin; guaranteeing of "basic security through demining, disarmament and upholding of law and order
throughout the country"; minimisation of food security; control HIV/AIDS spread; universal access to primary
education; improvement of health care provision; "rehabilitation and expansion of basic infrastructure for
economic, social and human development"; the valuing of "national resources, workers rights", creation of
employment opportunities and enhancing of the labour market; consolidation of "the rule of law through
improvement of administration and management of resources and [public] transparency"; and creation of
enabling environment for macroeconomic growth that allows a steady development of the markets ensuring the
reduction of poverty" (GoA 2004, 2005; UNDAF 2005/2008).
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meeting this objective (UNDAF 2005/2008:2, 5). UNDAF sees the government as its primary
partner on technocratic, policy, coordination and institutional affairs, while also
recommending a strengthening of UN's "pragmatic links with NGOs and civil society"
(UNDAF 2005/2008:11). During the UNDP 2007 Annual Programme Review, government's
Vice Minister of Planning stated, " ... the former cooperation models fell short of tending to
the economic, political and local setting of each country... fortunately, the cooperation
partners became aware that it was no longer possible to go on applying the traditional criteria
in development aid ... [they] have since been introducing profound changes to this
cooperation" (UNDP 2007: 15).
Lastly, government's relations with Bretton Woods Institutions are relatively recent. Angola
joined the World Bank and the IMF in 1989. The IMF is yet to lend funding to Angola
following the failure of the two Staff Monitored Programmes (SMPs) briefly attempted in
1995 and then in 2000-2001. The IMF has claimed that on both occasions the government
failed to meet the principles of financial transparency and proper economic management
(Hodges 2004:26; UN 2003:85-86; WB 2008). On the other hand, the World Bank has
maintained a multi-prong public-private partnership engagement in Angola through its
Angola Country Office. This has included the government, UN agencies, donors, NGOs, and
the private sector. However, government's leverage in this alliance is its privilege to set the
agenda and framework, although in view of the Bank's liberalising and administrative
software technology (WB 2008)30.
3.4 Conclusion
Policy dynamics do indicate that the post-conflict reconstruction and development process in
Angola is indeed centralising toward a state-led model. Since mid-2000s, both multilateral
and bilateral partners have been increasingly elevating the government as the leading
development partner in their policies and engagement with Angola. This trend is particularly
marked by the central and defining place that the government's PRSPs now have in any
development agenda and plan for Angola. However, NGOs and the larger CSO are not being
shunned, but simply relegated behind the government in terms of agenda setting, policy-




implementation of social and civil projects and programmes. Their "watchdog" status is
being remoulded from anti-statism to one that is more complementary to state. Thus, the
concern arising from some NGO and CSO quarters about this centralising paradigm seems to
be motivated by the experience of the mid-1990s and early 2000s when NGOs and CSOs
were at the centre of donor policy and the primary channels of aid for humanitarian relief and
assistance. The difference now is that the tone is changing from temporal relief goals to long-
term development agenda. Moreover, deepening donor-government relations are undercutting
NGOs and CSOs' international privilege, which may sideline them politically as the
international community would now have reasons to be more lenient toward the government.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH METHOD AND METHODOLOGY
4. Introduction
The previous chapter surveyed the literature on the role ofNGOs in development in the post-
Cold War era. It observed that the primacy that NGOs have enjoyed as agents of development
on the international stage is politically fading out in Angola's post-war reconstruction and
development context. Indeed, a centralising agenda is emerging whereby the State is being
ascribed the central and leading role.
This chapter concerns the collection of fieldwork data. It sets out the research method
employed to collect first hand empirical data from the research location, and spells out the
theoretical framework/methodology for data analysis.
4.1 Research method
This study has employed a qualitative research method, complemented by desk research. The
instruments used for the qualitative method were in-depth and semi-structured interviews,
and library-based literature study made up the desk research. The qualitative research method
was adopted because the study has sought to collect [the] subjective perspectives and
experiences of the study population (FHI 2007). Thus, since the study problem was to
identify NGOs' policy response in the face of the apparently centralising development model
that is taking shape in Angola and which has potential to alienate the contribution of NGOs,
the interviews were targeted at senior management staff of both local and international NGOs
that are operating in the country. As organisational policy custodian, this staff group is best
placed to reveal their organisations' policies and operational frameworks.
4.1.1 Sampling and data collection
The sampling frame was limited to Luanda, the capital of Angola. This is because Luanda is
the base of the most number of NGOs that are active in the country and is the primary trend-
setter. Also, almost all NGOs that are operating in the provinces still have their headquarters
in Luanda. The census was obtained from the latest updated Directory of National and
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International NGOs produced by the Unidade Tecnica de Coordenarao da Ajuda
Humanitaria (UTCAH) i.e. Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance,
which operates under the Angolan Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration. The
directory is dated 2007, and UTCAH is the public organ charged with the registration and
coordination of civil organisations and their activities in the country. As such, the census used
is the latest national official record (UTCAH 2007). The UTCAH's 273 page directory
contains all the organisational details of registered and recognised NGOs31 that are active in
the country including organisation name, country of origin, name of the national
representatives, genre of activity, geographical area(s) of operation, contacts: physical and
telephonic addresses, and registration status. To obtain this information, the researcher
submitted a formal request to UTCAH's General Office. The request stated the reason and
purpose of seeking the information.
The UTCAH directory records a total of 320 legally recognised NGOs operating in Angola,
of which 200 are national/local and 120 are international. It records 212 fully registered
NGOs, 124 of which are local and 88 are international. The latter data is a reversal of the data
of 2006 which recorded seventy-eight (78) fully registered local NGOs and ninety-seven (97)
fully registered international NGOs, together totalling 175 fully registered NGOs (UTCAH
2007:6). Of the total 320 recognised NGOs operating countrywide, 220 are active in Luanda,
the capital province and the research site. Of the 220 NGOs, 120 are local/national and 55
international. Of the 212 fully registered NGOs operating countrywide, 134 are active ill
Luanda, from which 89 are local and 45 are international NGOs (UTCAH 2007).
A sample of eighteen (18) NGOs was randomly selected for interview. The selection criteria
were the following NGO activities: involvement in the areas of social, development and
welfare, human rights and emergency assistance. The NGOs were directly invited to
participate in the research via telephone and physical invitations. At least three respondents
from each organisation's senior management staff best placed to speak on behalf of the
organisation were solicited as interlocutors. In most cases, however, the organisations availed
only one respondent for reasons of time constraint and to avoid content repetition, except for
three international NGOs which availed two respondents each. The status of the respondents
JI Not all recognised NGOs that are active in Angola have a full registration status according to the law issued in
2004 concerning the coordination ofNGOs and their activities in the country. This law ratifies that all NGOs
must have sufficient funding, although the meaning of sufficiency is not clearly defined, and must regularly
report about their activities in the country to the Government through the UTCAH.
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interviewed ranges from national representatives to country directors, deputy general
directors and programme coordinators and managers. Because of time constraints, some
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner i.e. a strictly question and response
process and others involved in-depth interview sessions. A total of nineteen (19) interviews
were conducted, including seven (7) national NGOs and eleven (11) international NGOs32 .
4.2 Theoretical framework/methodology
The theoretical framework employed for data analysis draws distantly on Snavely and
Desai's (2001) "government-non-profit relationship" framework developed to analyse
interactions between local government and NGOs in a context of decentralisation of public
administration. This framework obtains rationale in the context of the expanding role of
NGOs in development, the character of non-profit social service enterprise that both
government and NGOs share, and the subsequent complementarity they can share on account
of their individual weaknesses and strengths in the fulfilment of their social enterprise
services (Snavely and Desai 2001:248-249). This framework also lends value to the systemic,
rather than issue-specific, nature of the study whose concern is the role of NGOs in the
structural agency of Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and development process. While
NGOs' issue-specific agency is not of primary concern in the study, this component can be
detected in their work values and motivations as subsumed in their policy response (s).
The framework engages with the wide dynamics of development process through the three
analytical tools employed, namely, politics, policy and economy. These three categories
capture the essence of the various strategic and operational mechanisms that have been
employed in the process and agenda of peacebuilding and development, and they are the
main spheres where NGOs and CSOs have engaged in the outworking of this project. The
political tool is employed to assess the unique contribution that NGOs can lend to the process
of political transition the country is undergoing from war to peace, and to the long-term
process of national political stabilisation and development. Based on the empirical data, this
is pursued by examining NGOs' subjective experience(s) and perspective(s) on the country's
political transition process, and their immediate/short-term and long-term responses as civil
actors in terms of both policy and action. The policy tool is employed to permeate the
32 See appendix r to view the interview questionnaire.
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assessment of what unique contribution NGOs can make to public policy development and
implementation in the current transitional context, and in terms of the long-term vision and
process of national reconstruction and development. Based on the empirical data, this is
pursued by examining what distinct endowments NGOs may have in the area of policy-
making and service delivery that other social stakeholders, particularly the public sector, may
not necessarily have. This is observed in terms of strategy, practice, action and vision. Lastly,
the economy tool refers to unique market activities that NGOs can perform in the economy
that can contribute to the country's social and economic development. Based on the empirical
data, this is pursued by analysing whether NGOs have policies and are pursuing activities as
economic "multipliers" i.e. policies and activities that can contribute income into the
economy through for example "grants, contracts, sales of services", and job creation (Snavely
and Desai 200 I :255); as "producers of amenities" i.e. policies and activities that can
contribute in creating an attractive economic environment through provision of facilities like
"museums, performance art, libraries, education, recreation, sports, and youth and senior
services" (ibid); as "suppliers of producer services" i.e. policies and activities related to "job
training, creation of skilled workforce through education, and advancement of technology"
(ibid); and as "suppliers of consumer goods" i.e. if NGOs have policies and are pursuing
activities that can provide services that consumers can buy, such as "health care, recreation,
entertainment, cultural activities, education, housing, and counselling services" (ibid p.256).
The employment of these three analytical tools is useful for assessing whether or not NGOs
can make a distinct contribution in the country's reconstruction and development process.
The analysis draws on NGOs' experiences and perspectives as expressed on the empirical
data, and is placed in the current national development context in which a centralising, state-
led model is taking shape.
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MAP OF THE A ALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Actor Socio-development functions
NGOs Politics Policy Economy
Transition, Public Multiplier, provider
Policy/activity stabilisation, policy/development of amenities,
development provider of services
NGO unique NGO unique NGO unique






The previous chapter looked at the data collection method and the data analysis framework
the study has employed. This chapter analyses the data in two stages. The first stage
descriptively identifies the main themes emerging from the data guided by the items that were
used in. the questionnaire for data collection. The second stage is a critical, issue-based
analysis. It focuses on the key questions that the research seeks to answer, namely, to what
extent can NGOs participate in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development
process; do NGOs have the potential to make a unique contribution to this process; what is
the NGO policy response to the trends? What is the better approach for the country's post-
conflict reconstruction and development, a centralised, command or a decentralised,
participatory approach? This chapter is followed by a synthesis chapter.
5.1 NGO vision for the post-conflict reconstruction of Angola
Regarding the mission of NGOs, there is consensus among the NGOs studied that there
should be a move from emergency intervention to sustainable development engagement,
while recognising the existence of cases and situations that still require relief assistance. They
posit that war damages demanded emergency succour, and the socio-political environment
was not conducive for development. Now that the war has ended, stage is set for the pursuit
oflong-term sustainable development agenda and intervention.
...with the end of the conflict NGOs have had to renew or adapt their visions and work to the
new context in order to continue to operate since there is no more justification for an
emergency only kind of mission. NPA has managed to restructure and adapt itself to the new
context. (NPA)
During the conflict period in Angola its [Aji-icare's] mission and work focused on emergence
assistance to refugees and displaced peoples. From 2003 its mission changed to development
project. (Africare)
In the past we engaged in emergency projects which we have now transformed into
development projects to respond to the new context in which we are. Our projects are being
restructured to focus more on development. (CICA)
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For NGOs, the VISIon of post-conflict development should be larger than an economIC
development of growth indicators alone. They are thinking about a development based on
fundamental human rights. That is, they view that the country's development should be based
on the goals, principles and norms of social development and human welfare, justice and
equity, gender emancipation, participation, democratisation, transparency and accountability,
institutional efficiency, and homegrown agenda and approaches.
Social development and human welfare are viewed in two ways. It is first argued that rural
and agrarian development should have a central place in the development agenda. This is
posited in view of the urban-based modernisation projects being pursued by the government,
while the larger rural section of the country lacks social infrastructures and security and
physical links with modem facilities that are necessary for socio-economic development.
Agricultural development is posited as a potential alternative source of development besides
oil, because development cannot dependent on oil resources alone33 , and because agriculture
has been the major source of subsistence for the majority of the population. Second, social
development and human welfare are viewed in human development terms. Since the vast
majority of the population lacks economic and political capacity to be self-reliant and active
participants in the country's development process, it is posited that health care, food security,
civic and formal education should occupy a central place in the development agenda so that
all Angolans may be active instead of passive agents in the development process.
Oil wealth has proved to have negative impact in development process because of interest
issues that underlie it. That is why there is a need to develop the agricultural sector since most
of the population is rural and lives on agriculture. Agriculture...rural development...should be
main aspects in the country's economic development. (ADRA)
Economics is certainly an important aspect of development, but for us that is not the central
aspect. For us development is primarily about the improvement of human capacity to become
able to respond to the chal1enges that life presents... to have the ability to meet one's basic
needs and to have the ability to be an active participant in the process of reconstruction and
advancement of society towards a better reality and conditions. (AAEA)
Justice, equity and gender emancipation are expressed in terms of fair distribution of
resources. This means that the provision of social infrastructures and services, especially in
the areas of health and HIV/AIDS, child care, education, job creation, should be
proportionate to the country's economic product and capacity. Moreover, the vision of public
33 Angola is Sub-Saharan Africa's biggest oil producer after Nigeria. Oil resources have been the backbone of
the country's economy, accounting for over 80% of the annual GNP and total public revenue (Teka 2008:2).
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servIce and development should decentralise from Luanda, the capital provInce, into the
hinterland, and there should be an end to the clientelism and cronyism of the public sector.
Luanda should not continue to be the beginning and the end of all things; the point of
departure and the point of arrival. This needs to be changed. It is in this way that there will be
a stronger possibility of eliminating the problem of clientelism that is assailing the country's
public sector. (ADRA)
... the question is how to bring about a development that includes social development. I think
creation and distribution of wealth are essential. What is happening is that many individual
elites get big money shares from public funds in the course of the so-called
liberalisationlprivatisation reform which have not happened fairly. Only elites have benefited
because the whole process has been filled with cronyism. (NPA)
The vision we have is one of a just Angola...all Angolan citizens should have the same rights
to the country's resources...there should be no violation of human rights ...all children should
have the right to have education, all Angolan citizens should have the right to participate in
the governance of their country...there should be social peace, access to employment, clean
water and other basic human rights. (NCA)
Development must be about social welfare of human beings in various aspects... satisfaction of
basic human needs. CICA has many social projects that target the development of the human
person. (CIA)
NGOs posit that the revival of democratic politics in the country is vital to advance
participation, transparency, accountability, and public institutional efficiency. They argue that
homegrown development agenda and methods can better occur in a context where power is
mediated by electoral processes and monitored through decentralisation of public
administration, cultivation of capacity in the public sector, good governance, transparent and
accountable economic management, and research-based policy-making.
Generally, the development process that the government is undertaking has failed to hold
interaction and dialogue with communities; it has not been informed by proper empirical
research; and it has lacked public consultation. We are insisting for these elements to be
incorporated in the country's development agenda. (NCC)
The problem is: the Angolan government has a weak link with the people, which is
characterised by for example weak public services delivery, among other things. The
government has access to oil resources which it uses to do whatever it decides to do without
consulting the people. The government has development plans that we do not consider to be
the best for the country at the stage where it is now. Such plans are not pro-poor. All that is
being pursued is an economic growth based on indicators that do not necessarily include the
people, let alone the children. (SCA)
What Angola needs is democratic institutions to manage the country's resources and socio-
political and economic affairs in an adequate manner. ..what is needed are proper structures
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that would enable adequate distribution of resources, safeguard human rights, build
infrastructures. (NPA)
These NGO concerns for democratisation underline the views they [NGOs] express about the
roles the international community, government and the civil sector should play in the
country's reconstruction process as observed in the sections below.
5.2 NGOs' perspective on the role of the international community
There is some divergence in view between LNGOs and INGOs regarding the role of the
international community in the country's reconstruction and development process. LNGOs
are critical of the international community's rejection of a second donor conference that the
Angolan government requested in the aftermath of the war in 2002 to discuss funding
possibilities for the country's reconstruction. It is argued that such a conference would have
enabled an open interface between the government and international community's
perspectives, and it could have fast tracked the reconstruction and development process.
Contrary to the widely held international perception that Angola possesses sufficient
resources to fund the reconstruction project itself, LNGOs widely believe that the country
still needs aid despite its vast economic potential. They argue that the government cannot yet
adequately optimise, manage and utilise such potential because of its limited capacity, poor
distribution policy, and that the country is currently faced with many needs. It is posited that
the conditions the international community imposed for the realisation of the conference were
too strict and failed to prioritise the interests of the Angolan people.
One negative move the international community made was to reject the government's call for
an international donor conference. It is wrong that donors refused this discussion to take
place.. .it would have directly confronted the perspectives of the international community and
national perspectives on issues. From there a way forward for the country's development
process would have been openly discussed...the country's reconstruction and development
process still needs aid despite its oil wealth. It is the lack of aid that has motivated the
government to mortgage oil for cash in agreements with certain lenient bilateral partners.
Western donors imposed conditionalities are mostly unhelpful although some of them may be
useful. (ADRA)
You cannot punish an entire nation because of a few corrupt, bad public officials. That is just
not fair. The role of the international community should be to support the Angolan people
unconditionally because this is a people barely emerging from a painful war. This should be
the priority.. .instead of just focusing on issues of poor governance...as a means of ensuring
government does not mismanage aid-funds... strict measures of accountability instead of pre-
aid conditionalities...would be a more helpful approach. (CAPCF)
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... the image that has been built about Angola at both global and local levels is that Angola is a
wealthy country. It is no longer in need of assistance because it has oil, diamonds, etc...But
the reality is that it is still international donors who are financing development projects in
Angola, at least those projects that are pronounced. (NCC)
However, INGOs are expressing a somewhat different view. They believe that Angola does
not primarily need financial assistance; neither should the donor conference appeal have been
about money. Rather, Angola has the capacity to shoulder most of the financial budget it
needs to rebuild and develop. For this, the public sector needs liberalising. The assistance the
international community should therefore provide is technical assistance in economic
management and accountability, and in good governance. This is because of Angola's poor
soft i.e. human and hard i.e. public structures and institutions capacity. However, INGOs do
not completely write out the possibility and eventual need of complementary financial
assistance by the international community to Angola.
The international community assistance to Angola's reconstruction and development does not
have to be financial only. One major problem facing Angola in its development is the lack of
trained and educated cadres. If the international community is not willing to assist financially,
it may assist in terms of training. (DWb)
Many equate the international community with money. But that is not what Angola needs.
What Angola needs are democratic institutions to manage the country's resources and socio-
political and economic affairs in an adequate manner...it is unfortunate that the GoA's
intention for the donor conference also was about money. That is wrong. (NPA)
What the international community can give in terms of aid is nothing compared to the
resources the government has access to internally. The government does not need the WB,
IMF or anybody else to fund the country's reconstruction and development project. (SCA)
LNGOs have however noticed a recent policy shifting among Western donors, believed to be
a result of the government turning eastward and the subsequent geopolitical advantage that
particularly China, among other Asian Drivers, is gaining in the country.
The Chinese wave has awakened the West. Now a growing number of diplomatic and
cooperation treaties is happening between the government and Western countries. Western
countries are now realising that China is steadily beginning to control the Angolan market and
they do not want to be left out of the bounty. They are now finding it worth a while to re-
establish relations and cooperation with Angola. (NCC)
... for the past two years or so, the West has been showing a more lenient approach because it
is realising that it is gradually loosing the central position it used to have in Angola's
international policy scheme since the donor conference debacle. It is realising that Asia is
steadily becoming a more central and commanding player. The international community is
beginning to look beyond just the issue of poor governance. It is now focusing more on how
Angola can be helped in this transitional phase of development from civil war. (CAPCF)
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The majority of LNGOs are relying on foreign funding to be active, which, as both the
LNGOs and INGOs concur, is being normatively channelled through INGOs. Only a limited
number of well established LNGOs have received some funding directly from international
donors. Otherwise, LNGOs can accede to international funding only through the mediation of
INGOs. Besides multilateral sources and their own internally developing funding
mechanisms, INGOs are receiving a significant bulk of their funding from their governments
of origin, foreign private sector agents operating both abroad and in Angola, community
fundraisers from their countries of origin, as well as from different foreign governments.
Thus despite the short-term international community funding horizon for Angola, INGOs are
confident they can secure funding for up to 2010 on average, with relative and contingent
prospects of securing further funding for the period beyond. Conversely, LNGOs have been
facing funding crises since the end of the emergence context. Along with a direct access to
international funding, LNGOs are finding it hard to obtain intermediary funding from INGOs
as a result of deemed lengthy processes and procedures being required by their international
counterparts. This has been a discomforting experience for LNGOs, some of which are
growing sceptical of the motives underlying INGOs' presence in the country. The next three
quotes are from INGOs, followed by three quotes from LNGOs.
As an international NGO, ACORD's operation is dependent on donor funding ...we do have
donors seeking for partnerships with local organisations and to implement their projects
through those local organisations. Such donors include the IMF, Oxfam, governments (such
as Norway and Netherlands). This also creates funding possibilities for organisations like
ACORD. (ACORD)
We receive our funds from international donor agencies and some foreign governments that
have endorsed our vision and shown interest in social development issues...we also have some
self-initiatives toward fundraising such as the kixicr£!dito ... DW has partnered with many local
and international organisations. Without partnering with other NGOs work can be more
difficult. (DWb)
INGOs are main channels of funding from the IC to LNGOs. The Ie prefers to channel
funding through us, INGOs, rather than directly to local NGOs...an attempt is being made to
get donors to possibly also directly support LNGOs. However, the challenge is on fund
management...besides these [i.e. USAID and ExxoMobil], we have other donors such as
UNICEF and the WB... (Africare)
In 2004 we had a short partnership with People's Development Aid (ADPP)...but things did
not go well when it came to implementation...ADPP did not really have a good faith. They
had motives that were different from philanthropy. There are many other INGOs with much
money they get from their governments of origin, but without a genuine interest to cooperate
with LNGOs...the relationship between LNGOs and INGOs has been a partnership of
beggary.. .to receive anything a LNGO has to submit a modest financial project proposal
(perhaps worth K20/30 thousand - $300/400). Then it has to go back and forth for many
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months to be granted anything...many of their [INGOs'] governments use them as agents to
carry out projects that advance the foreign policy of their countries. (CAPCF)
Relationship between INGOs and LNGOs tends to depend on international donors...donors
need local agents to implement their projects and fulfil their agendas. In tum, LNGOs need
donors to function. We [NCe] have received funding from various international
organisations...such as Global Witness, Christian Aid, European Union, OECD, Open
Society, Embassies. (NCC)
Funds are a problem... there are INGOs whose representatives are more racist than anything
else. Until we find alternative ways of fundraising...we will remain subjected to such
attitudes. For you to get just a little money for one single project they make you go back and
forth for a long time... in our own country we are being obliged to write reports in English. It
is the INGOs who should learn to speak Portuguese if they want to come here work. (N/A)34
Despite this intermediary funding controversy, INGOs and LNGOs have had a structural
collaboration under two umbrella organisations, namely, the Forum of LNGOs (FONGA) and
Forum of INGOs (CONGA). The main challenge being faced at this compact level is poor
coordination. There is not a concerted NGO front on issues confronting the country. Despite
some unison activities, such as the Angola Peacebuilding Program (PCP)35 and the first
conference of Angola's CSOs realised in November 2007 under the leadership of FONGA36,
generally each NGO has pursued individual agenda and programmes.
There is no concelied CSO perspective about things in the country. CSO would partner better
with the GoA in the country's development process by concerting its ideas into a common
front. (DW 1)
Generally, there has been an important partnership between INGOs and LNGOs, especially
through the two main organisational bodies: CONGA and FONGA. .. there is interchange
between the two organisations but not yet a common agenda per se. (ACORD)
5.3 NGOs' perspective on the role of the government
There is consensus among both INGOs and LNGOs that the GoA should lead the country's
reconstruction and development process. It is posited that the primary responsibility of the
process falls upon the public sector because the people are still fragile and unprepared, and
the country is in rubbles that need cleaning. Hence the need to build human, structural and
institutional bases that can support a sustainable nation-building. This perspective is however
34 Undisclosed source for reasons of confidentiality
35 This program was initiated in 1998 by eight NGOs, local and international. It aimed to build the capacity of
partner NGOs in leadership, conflict resolution and human rights as a way to contribute to peacemaking and
peacebuilding (Efraim et al 2001 :3).
36 The main achievements of this conference were the addressing of some challenges facing NGOs in the
country, such as a feeling of illegitimacy, lacking leadership capacity, and an horizontal platform and relational
proximity it encouraged between Luanda and other provinces based NGOs (Chatham 2008b: 11-12).
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cautious. NGOs posit that the state alone cannot rebuild and develop the nation without
substantive collaboration with the private and civil sectors. Thus, the public space should
open up to democratic debate. The initiative of administrative decentralisation and
deconcentration the GoA initiated in 2004 is viewed positively. However, its development
and implementation is deemed too slow and reluctant.
The mam reasons advanced for a public-private-civil development effort are the state's
limited capacity in terms of human, institutional and structural resources, and the culture of
c1ientelism and patrimonialism and poor resource utility and distribution that have assailed
and marked the public sector. Moreover, NGOs oppose a capitalistic development model
because of the hegemony and monopoly this gives the private sector at the expense of social
development and the poorer population.
Contrary to the democratic doctrine of shrinking the state, we believe that at the present stage
where Angola is the GoA has an important role to play. The private sector itself is not devoid
of problems. It ends up building monopolies that ultimately get used only to advance
individual and corporate interests over social and national interests...however, what is
necessary and pivotal in a model where government has a strong function is to open the
public sector for debate ...the public space needs to be opened in order to impede anybody
from taking monopoly over it and to claim it their own. (ADRA)
...we agree that the government should lead the country. What we do not agree with is that
civil society should not challenge and hold the government accountable for what it is or not
doing; that civil society should not advocate for human rights, fight the government on some
issues. (AIN)
There are crucial areas that the government needs to take up such as education, social
infrastructure, health... [otherwise] the people will suffer. Even in Germany the government
intervenes in these areas...market activities need expanding at local, provincial and national
levels...this would be difficult without infrastructures... the government has the responsibility
to intervene more in this context. The country's economy is not yet mature for the
government to get out completely... the government is not an independent
institution...therefore, it is fundamental for there to be a participatory governance process. The
government should open up more to allow civil society to participate in the governance of the
country. (AAA)
There is a unanimous reaction to the hostile politics affecting NGO activity in the country.
NGOs posit that civil action is important for development and it should not be dampened.
However, views on public regulation of NGO activity are more nuanced. Some LNGOs
disapprove of the Law 84/02 and the supervisory mandate of the UTCAH. They believe that
the real purpose of this law is "control" i.e. to give GoA leverage to stop NGO activities that
may hurt the state politically. Furthermore, it is believed that due to the cost that it adds to the
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legalisation process of new organisations, this law poses hindrance to the birth of new civil
organisations and therefore an obstacle to growth of civil power. It is argued that the UTCAH
is constitutionally illegitimate because its coordination authority limits the legal space of
NGO operation. Also, because NGOs only provide summary reports of their activities,
UTCAH's coordination is considered to be practically pointless since such summaries cannot
really capture the full extent of NGOs' activities. And to provide comprehensive reports
would not work because writing them would cost activity time.
The law that was issued in 2004 is absurd because it clashes with the constitution which
allows for freedom of association and assembly as long as no infringement is made.. .! could
still get people together to discuss and undertake open activities about the coming electoral
process...even if our views did not support the current government. We may do all these
things although we do not have money... some organisations are facing difficulties to legalise
because of the cost the process involves... UTCAH expects NGOs to submit regular
reports.. .in the current context of development those sketches are inappropriate. They cannot
really show all an organisation is doing...a much bigger report is not viable to do on a regular
basis due to time and other constraints there would be. (AAEA)
...that law is very absurd since UTCAH simply wants to interfere with NGO activity because
NGOs pose obstacles to the government from freely realising its private agendas. This law
makes legal room for government to be able to completely close down an organisation if it
really feels bothered by it... the law that was enacted before in 1991, law 14/91.. .does not
force us to account to anybody about what we do as long as our existence is constitutionally
legal...we can constitutionally argue that UTCAH is not a legitimate institution...UTCAH is
about analysing activities and how much they are or not affecting the government...this law
[84/02] is and will continue to affect the work of many organisations. New NGOs will be
discouraged from emerging due to the compounded bureaucracy and cost involved in the
process of legalisation. Some NGOs will simply dismantle. (NCe)
Other LNGOs have more flexible sentiments about the logic of UTCAH coordination.
However, they still argue that even those LNGOs that may lack the funding security required
by law in order to be legitimate actors are still driven by social consciousness and will to
make a. difference. Such virtues are important and should not be discarded. Rather, the
government should support them with funding.
Those organisations that are being unproductive may have to close down. Perhaps that is a
fair point being made by the government. However, I also cannot fully blame such
organisations for lacking resources to become duly active because national organisations are
mostly formed on the basis of a modest ideal which is to contribute in the country's
reconstruction and development process... they need support. And this is a dilemma because
the government is not being sensitive. (CAPCF)
Our organisation has up to this point depended solely on member contribution...for us to be
able to do more work the government should support NGOs financially according to project
proposals. (IWA)
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On the other hand, many INGOs concur with the institution of public supervision of NGO
activity in the country because of the need for order and accountability. At the same time,
however, they complain about the bureaucracy this has involved. They also have concern that
any political motivation that may underline this institution could limit the scope of civil
engagement, and some gauge that UTCAH does not necessarily have the logistical capacity
to see its supervisory role through anyway.
We do not experience any fonn of legal pressure from the government. In fact, we do not
think the law here is that strict. In the United States, for example, the law is much stricter. So
I do not quite understand it when I hear NGOs critique the government of being controlling.
That is just an excuse for them not to be accountable to anybody and to be under no fonn of
control whatsoever. I think that some accountability is very necessary. For example, the NGO
called Maos Livres de Angola recently had many problems with the government simply
because it was going too far beyond limits...but the bottom-line is that the government does
not want NGOs meddling into its politics. (SCA)
Let me say that UTCAH does not have the capacity to monitor the work of NGOs in the
entire country. (NPA)
...we do not have a problem with the coordination of NGO actlvity. But what can be
problematic is control or exaggerated control over this activity. That is not good. (NCA)
5.4 Are NGOs being excluded from the reconstruction process?
The international community's policy towards Angola is certainly shifting from state
alienation to its elevation as central partner in the country's reconstruction and development.
In tum, this shifting policy is influencing the trend of aid channelling from a predominantly
NGO and humanitarian relief orientation to an increasing focus on long-term development
projects. But despite the primacy of the state, NGOs and CSOs remain part of the policy
scheme. They are being posed as necessary partners to the state (see section 3.3).
How are NGOs themselves viewing this? As observed in the previous section (4.1), both
LNGOs and INGOs generally agree that the government should playa leading role given the
country's lack of basic development infrastructures needed to sustain the reconstruction
process. However, NGOs feel the need for a proactive liberalisation of the public sector
through participatory governance and decentralisation given the country's history of strong
political centralisation, clientelism, patrimonialism and weak civil sector. Moreover, NGOs
argue that the government currently lacks sufficient human and institutional capacity, and
there is concern that the Law 84/02 can limit the political space ofNGOs and CSOs.
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However, NGOs are not without weaknesses of their own. Their weakness in policy
coordination, especially the lack of a common front between the FONGA and the CONGA,
can undermine the potential of their collective contribution to the reconstruction process.
Apart from occasional collaborations and partnerships there have been between individual
NGOs, NGOs express different feelings and points of view on a number of issues, for
example in the relationship between LNGOs and INGOs regarding funding and public
regulation of NGO activity. Experience elsewhere suggests that a common front and solid
intra-relations are essential for successful lobbying and positive development impact. By
taking a "unified stance", the Agency Coordination Body for Afghanistan Relief (ACBAR),
the umbrella organisation of NGOs in Afghanistan, succeeded in having combat troops
removed from their provincial humanitarian assistance missions in 2005. The troops'
presence had been jeopardising their missions (Zaklilwal and Thomas 2006:7). Recent studies
on the relationship between NGOs and the strengthening of peacebuilding in Guatemala,
Myanmar and Sri Lanka show that NGOs can often cause more harm than good. In
Guatemala, Pearce (2005:47) found that NGOs and social organisations were turned into
"projects for an externally driven agenda" by donors because the latter had taken "a very
technical and instrumental approach to the idea of civil society". In Myanmar, Pearce
(2005:47) found that such a technical and instrumental approach and "its attached practice
had divided Mayans rather than strengthening them, delinking well-funded urban based
organisations from the rural areas, for instance". In Sri Lanka, Orjuela (2003 :21 0) found that
civil society is "necessary but not enough", especially because many of their activities were
"top-down, reaching the rural periphery from an urban centre. Civil society is not the same as
the people". He adds that NGOs' peace work in Sri Lanka "is done in rather fragmented
projects...rather than in the form of a dynamic mass-based social movement" (ibid). Angolan
LNGOs' feeling of entitlement for public funding to amend their financial woes can result in
distracting rent-seeking behaviour, as well as in a weakening of their voices on issues due to
the compunction of donor loyalty that dependence on a public funding scheme may involve.
5.5 Unique contribution NGOs can make in the reconstruction process
NGOs are claiming to have a unique socio-economic and political capital that the public
sector, and even the private sector, lacks. They argue that they can bridge the gap between
micro, meso and macro processes through their background in individual, community and
provincial levels of engagement, and their unique areas of activity. This is seen as a unique
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NGO potentiality given the GoA's lack of experience, expertise and logistics to engage at
these various levels outside its traditionally centralised approach, and because the GoA is yet
to tread in certain development areas. While the multi-level engagement experience is
indisputable, one critical element in the NGOs' claim of greater experience in certain
development areas is the fact that until recently most NGOs operating in the country only
accumulated experience in emergency work. It is only now that shift is being made to
development work. Only a handful of NGOs, mainly international, have since had a dual
engagement in both emergency and development, although such experience is not necessarily
completely local but international. Thus, only a handful of NGOs could actually lend unique
expertise to the initial phase of the development process since most, not unlike the GoA, are
merely beginning to embark on the new telTitory of development work.
NGOs claim to have a unique ability to create a link between politics at grassroots level and
politics at formal level through their activities in community empowerment, mobilisation,
education, and human rights lobbying and advocacy. In this way, the political aspirations,
concerns and agency of individual citizens and communities can be aroused and the country's
political culture subsequently advanced.
NGOs are essential for village work...govemment's work is failing to reach deep in the
communities in the remotest parts of the country. This means that government is not yet
properly prepared and lacks capacity to facilitate work at various levels. In this NGOs can
work as facilitators. (AAA)
The question of human rights, promotion and protection against violations is another area
where NGOs can playa unique role: as watchdog over government... (OCHA)
NGOs can enable other forms of civil organisations to better organise themselves. (NPA)
We are engaging in rural areas where the government has not operated and will take rather
long to reach, and has been unsuccessful to reach. (CAPCF)
NGOs claim that they can uniquely contribute to public policy development through their
community experience and research, and to its implementation through their innovative
dynamics in social service delivery. This contribution can help to advance the
decentralisation process of the public administration, to build local autonomy and community
ownership of the development agenda and process.
NGOs can communicate efficiency skills to government in service delivery...there have
already been some inroads with the departments of health and agriculture. (Africare)
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NGOs can advice toward a more unified development approach that includes both rural and
urban areas rather than prioritising one, in most cases urban areas. (OCHA)
NGOs understand development issues and engage them from the view of communities.
(AAEA)
NGOs claim to be able to uniquely contribute to the expanSIOn of market activities as
economic multipliers by contributing to job creation by virtue of their expanding
demographics. "Statistically, NGOs have a strong weight in our society. There is a very high
number of people depending on them" (DWl). But such a potential could be boosted by
commitment, especially by INGOs, to a policy of preferential employment of local labour.
"Many INGOs bring with them everything even their own drivers and they find no room to
employ Angolans" (CICA).
Through their civic, informal and formal education and professional training activities, NGOs
are doubtless supplying the job market with more equipped labourers that business need to
develop, which seems to be an indirect and unique way of contributing to job creation and
livelihood security. This would make NGOs unique suppliers of producer goods as they
would be making a unique contribution to formation of human capital, which is fundamental
for the expansion of market activities. "We have started schools building projects in the
province of Cunene. In the Luanda province we are active in the districts of Sambizanga,
Cacuaco and Viana where we are engaging in water supply, combat against malaria and
polio, and in professional training projects. The latter aims at capacity building within
communities" (Africare). This contribution is particularly important given the country's poor
human development index. The latest statistics place Angola's HDI at 0.446, which gives it a
rank of l62nd out 177 countries with available data (UNDP 2007/2008).
NGOs also have a traditionally strong involvement in the informal economy and agriculture.
These are currently the country's largest sources of livelihood and the largest source of rural
subsistence. Their involvement in these sectors is very developmental because their diverse
activities seek to upgrade the level of entrepreneurship in the informal economy and the level
of production and commercialisation in the communities' agricultural activity. On this
account, NGOs seem to have a unique potential as suppliers of consumer goods by providing
products that many people need to survive and to better themselves economically.
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ADRA has a twofold strategy: (i) we have a rural development programme whose main
components are food security in terms of both production and distribution. (ii) We have a
credit programme which has two aspects: (a) micro-credit and (b) land management. In these
two programmes we seek to revive citizenry capacity to do local development work... to run
formal education programmes to strengthen schooling in the country... (ADRA)
DW work has focused on (i) land: with projects aimed at assisting poor communities to gain
land access and ownership. Without land ownership it is difficult for the poor to be
sustainable development agents. (ii) Formal and informal economic issues: DW has been
involved in work on infonnal economy...one major outcome of this work is the micro-credit
project called kixicredito. Credit is very important for the poor to become active economic
agents. (DW2)
These umque economIC contributions that NGOs show the ability to make are vital to
economic development. While the government is still comparatively limited to engage at
lower layers of rural setting, it can facilitate and help to expand what NGOs can and are
doing by providing infrastructure, policy incentives and strategic regulation.
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5.6 NGO policy response to the development trends
The GoA is gaining lead and primacy over NGOs as an agent of development in the policy
agenda of the international community for Angola's post-conflict peacebuilding project, and
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NGOs themselves concur that the GoA should playa central role in the process. However,
NGOs' concurrence is accompanied by the proviso that such a central state role is not an
assent to a state-autocratic development model. Rather, they are calling for a public-private-
civil partnership. To make sure that such partnership is attained, NGOs are pursuing a set of
strategic policy responses. They are first and foremost readjusting their former emergency
oriented engagement to development engagement in order to be relevant in the new context in
which the country now is and to secure continuity of funding. On the one hand, INGOs are
seeking to secure funding from their donor countries and agencies beyond 2010, while also
developing internal funding mechanisms. On the other hand, LNGOs are seeking to persuade
INGOs for more favourable terms of intermediary funding, while trying to access the donor
funding system so that they too may start receiving more direct funding without the
mediation of INGOs. Furthermore, a majority of LNGOs are also lobbying for a public
funding scheme, while some more established LNGOs are pursuing complementary internal
funding mechanisms. NGOs are also lobbying for a "public space" i.e. the decentralisation of
the public process including administration, policy-making, institutional building, budgeting.
They are seeking to make their unique contribution to the country's reconstruction process
through this space. NGOs are also seeking to focus their activities on rural and remote areas
because they identify that that is where the most immediate needs are and where the
development base the country needs is most scarce. They posit that the government does not
only lack experience to engage at such community level, but that its policy and logistical
arms are also still rather short to reach there.
One major weakness in these policy responses is the absence of a movement based vision.
The NGO community is failing to express a realisation for the need to transcend a project-
based framework of engagement if they are to stay the long course of development. This is
particularly relevant to the fact that there is no common front on issues within the sector, and
to the intermediary funding tension between local and international NGOs. A non-uniformist,
yet common vision can help tum the NGO sector into a more solid and credible non-
governmental and non-profit sector. A movement-based framework could also help transcend
the weak collective coordination the sector faces. Likewise, the cumbersomeness, protracted
delivery, and the project-only-based model of the intermediary funding from INGOs to
LNGOs about which LNGOs are complaining could be overcome by a model based on
longer-term partnerships, although according to organisational activity focus and concern.
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5.7 A centralised or a decentralised development model?
Quasi-statehood theory is helpful in pointing out the legitimacy and empirical weaknesses
that a developing state like Angola's can have as a liability to the process of development.
Moreover, the centralising post-conflict development model that is taking shape in the
country is not necessarily being motivated by a demonstrated government capacity to lead the
process. Rather, it is a result of various factors from the current international and Angola's
national political economic contexts. Of such, the most influential are the international
concern· and discourse on security and the rising influence of the Asian Drivers, especially
China, in the Angolan political economy. The former factor is prioritising the role of state in
the international security agenda in the face of international terrorism threat. The latter factor
refers to Western superpowers and liberal states favourably changing policy towards the GoA
on account of the door that their previously hard stance opened for China to make
geopolitical gains in the country and in the Sub-Sahara African region more generally. On the
other hand, Angola's lack of both hard and soft developmental base plus the precarious socio-
economic conditions in which most of its population are in the current transitional phase from
war to reconstruction, beg for the role of the state. The state is necessary in the pursuit of a
calculated and productive industrial policy towards the establishment of the solid and
sustainable development foundations the country needs.
Given the weaknesses and strengths that the public, private and civil sectors have
individually, there is a need for sectoral complementarity in order to achieve the
developmental base the country needs. Therefore, a participatory state-led development
framework seems both viable and necessary. The process of transition from war to
reconstruction and development will hardly be successful under a state-autocratic system,
given the current state's weaknesses in terms of human and institutional capacity and its
ongoing practice of clientelism and patrimonialism. Neither does it seem viable to shrink the
state to the neoliberal model given the massive socio-economic crises, discrepancy and
inequality prevailing in the country today. But a participatory state-led model can enable
complementarity between the public, private and civil sectors, as well as checks-and-balances




This study set out to investigate the substance of a perception that had been obtained from a
preliminary literature study on Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and development
process. Literature and events indicated that a centralising development model was taking
shape. As a result, NGOs were facing serious funding crises and political pressure in the
exercise of their activities. This perception raised concern about the role [and survival] of
NGOs in the post-conflict nation-building agenda. Thus, the study set out to investigate what
policy response NGOs are giving to the trends. Alongside this main objective, the study also
sought to identify what unique contribution the NGO sector can make to the nation-building
process, and to evaluate the validity and viability of the better development model between a
centralised, command approach and a decentralised, participatory approach.
To address this objective, the study employed a qualitative research method in order to obtain
NGOs' subjective experiences and perspectives. This process was mediated by in-depth and
semi-structured interviews with international and national NGOs that are based in Luanda,
Angola's capital province, although most of them are active countrywide.
The study is situated within the broader context of post-conflict peacebuilding agenda that
was formally introduced by former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. It
is within this broader pOlitico-economic context that development has been discoursed in the
post-Cold War era. As such, the study has explored the role that NGOs can play in Angola's
post-conflict peacebuilding agenda comparatively to the role that NGOs have been ascribed
on the international development stage. This analysis is mediated by three functional
categories, namely, politics, policy, economy.
The study found that a centralising development model is indeed taking shape in Angola's
post-conflict reconstruction and development process. This trend is not necessarily being
motivated by the Angolan state's show of competence to lead the process, but primarily by
the international security agenda and geopolitical concerns. NGOs report being pressed by a
funding crisis since most of the international assistance to Angola is by policy now being
generally channelled through the state towards macro reconstruction and development
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projects. Also, Angola's political environment still continues to be considerably hostile to
NGO and CSO activities.
In response, NGOs concur that the state should lead the nation-building process. This is
because the role of the public sector is viewed as central in the creation of the supportive
bases the country lacks for sustainable development. However, NGOs posit that such a state-
led framework should be participatory, accommodating of both the civil and private sectors
given the state's weaknesses in soft and hard capacity and its historically intransigent politics.
Thus, NGOs are committed to shifting their engagement from emergency to development,
securing development funding, lobbying for the opening of the public space, and focusing
their activities on rural, agricultural, human development and civic awareness.
Based on this policy and instrumental response, NGOs claim to have the ability to contribute
a unique socio-economic and political capital to the nation-building. Politically, NGOs show
the potential of bridging the gap between politics at informal and community level and
politics at formal level towards the building of an inclusive democracy. They show potential
to contribute distinctly to public policy development and implementation through their
community work experience and research and innovative dynamics in social service delivery.
Economically, NGOs show a unique potential as multipliers and suppliers of producer and
consumer goods that are vital to economic development.
The major weaknesses facing the NGO sector are a lack of common vision and coordination
on [certain key socio-political] issues; divisive intermediary funding relations between
INGOs and LNGOs; lack of a realisation for the need of a movement-based engagement
beyond a project-based engagement only; and the fact that only a handful of NGOs actually
have experience in development work, as most of them are barely beginning to shift gears
from the emergence paradigm to a development engagement paradigm.
However, given the dual reality of the Angolan quasi-statehood and the need for a strong
public sector intervention in the establishment of the developmental base the country needs
for sustainable development, a participatory state-led development model seems viable and
necessary for the current transitional phase at which the country is.
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APPENDIX ONE: OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
1. What vision of reconstruction and development does your organisation have for the post-
conflict Angola?
2. How does your organisation view the cunent stance of the international community on
Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and development process? What role does your
organisation view the international community should play?
3. What role does your organisation VIew the Angolan government should play III the
country's post-conflict reconstruction and development process?
4. What role does your organisation view civil society should play in the country's post-
conflict reconstruction and development process?
5. What role does your organisation view NGOs, as a distinct form of civil organisation,
should play in the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development process?
6. What instruments, theoretical and practical, is your organisation applying to playa role in
the country's post-conflict reconstruction and development process?
7. What kind of relationship does your organisation entertain with local/international NGOs?
What is your organisation's policy on that?
8. Does your organisation have secure funding? What is your source of finding? Are there
other ways your organisation plans to raise funding in the near/long future?
9. Is your organisation under any legal pressure? If not, why? If yes, what is your policy
response?
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APPENDIX TWO: LIST OF RESPONDENT ORGANISATIONS
Organisation: Action for Rural and Environmental Development (ADRA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Social services, agriculture, community development, institutional building, emergency
(included sub-sectors: public service, social assistance, food security, agro-cattle breeding, seed
distribution, civil society)
Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Jelembe Berlamino
Date of interview: 10/04/08
Place of interview: ADRA Head-office in Ingombota/Maculusso, Luanda
Organisation: Development Workshop (DWa)
Origin: Canada
Activity: Social services, income-generation, institutional building (induded sub-sectors: social
assistance, micro-credit, civil society)
Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Willy Piassa
Date of interview: 11/04/08
Place of interview: DW Project Office in Maculusso, Luanda
Organisation: Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development (ACORD)
Origin: Germany
Activity: Health, human rights, income-generation (sub-sectors: HIV/AIDS, civic education, gender,
micro-credit)
Interviewee: National Coordinator, Dr. Amilcar Salumbo
Date of interview: 15/04/08
Place of interview: ACORD Office in Largo lOde Maio, Luanda
Organisation: Development Workshop (DWb)
Origin: Canada
Activity: Social services, income-generation, institutional building (included sub-sectors: social
assistance, micro-credit, civil society)
Interviewee: Programme Manager/Coordinator, Mr. Fabrice Beutler
Date of interview: 16/04/08
Place of interview: DW Project Office in Maculusso, Luanda
Organisation: Future Child Club of Friends (CAPCF)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Agriculture, education, health, culture, emergence (sub-sectors: general education, nutrition,
sport and entertainment, food assistance)
Interviewee: National Representative, Mr. Jose Manuel Pedrinho
Date of interview: 17/04/08
Place of interview: CAPCF Head-office in Ingombota, Luanda
Organisation: Islamic Wing of Angola (IWA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Education, social services, professional training, construction and rehabilitation
Interviewee: President, Mr. Alhaji Foday Jabbi
Date of interview: 17/04/08
Place of interview: IWA Head-office in Martes/Cassequele, Luanda
Organisation: Africa Group of Sweden (GAS)
Origin: Sweden
Activity: Agriculture, education, human rights, health
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Interviewee: Country Representative in Angola Ms. Elin Schennings and Progamme Administrator
Ms. Georgina de Matos
Date of interview: 18/04/08
Place of interview: GAS Head-office in Baino Patrice Lumbumba, Luanda
Organisation: Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Community development, Action Against Mines
Interviewee: Development Programme Manager, Ms. Helena Zefanias Lowe
Date of interview: 21/04/08
Place of interview: NPA Head-office in Alvalade, Luanda
Organisation: Norwegian Church AID (AIN)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Human rights, health, social services, institutional building
Interviewee: Country Representative in Angola, Ms. Berit Stromme
Date of interview: 21/04/08
Place of interview: AIN Office in Ingombota, Luanda
Organisation: AFRICARE
Origin: United States of America
Activity: Health, emergency, agriculture, social services
Interviewee: Programme Coordinator, Mr. Mariano Lucas
Date of interview: 22/04/08
Place of interview: Africare Head-office in Martal, Luanda
Organisation: International Child Development Programmes (ICDP)
Origin: Norway
Activity: Health and Education
Interviewee: Country Deputy Representative in Angola, Ms. Maria Luisa Martins
Date of interview: 22/04/08
Place of interview: ICDP Office in Ilha do Cabo, Luanda
Organisation: Association for the Support of the Abandoned Child (AACA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Education, social services, agriculture (included sub-sectors: general education, public
service)
Interviewee: National Director, Ms. Rosaria Maria Conceic;ao Pereira
Date of interview: 22/04/08
place of interview: AACA Head-office in Maculusso, Luanda
Organisation: German Agrarian Action (AAA)
Origin: Germany
Activity: Community Development and Integrated Projects
Interviewee: National Programme Coordinator, Ms. Ursula Languamp and Asst. National
Programme Coordinator Mr. Manfred Bischofberger
Date of interview: 23/04/08
Place of interview: AAA Office in Largo Lucrecia Paim, Luanda
Organisation: Angolan Association for Adult Education (AAEA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: [Informal] Education and Civic Education
Interviewee: National Representative, Mr. Victor Manuel Barbosa
Date of interview: 23/04/08
Place of interview: AAEA Office in Maianga/Cassenda, Luanda
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Organisation: National Counselling Centre (NCC)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Socio-political development, civic education, human rights, democracy, legal counselling
and advocacy, activism
Interviewee: Executive Director, Dr. Reis Luis
Date of interview: 24/04/08
Place of interview: NCC Head-quarters in Vila Alice, Luanda
Organisation: Save the Children in Angola (SCA)
Origin: England
Activity: Health, education, social services: HIV/AIDS, general education, child protection
Interviewee: National Director, Mr. Douglas Steinberg
Date of interview: 24/04/08
Place of interview: SCA Office in Sambizanga/Bairro Openirio, Luanda
Organisation: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Origin: International Community Organisation (UN)
Activity: Media: education, democracy, human rights, democracy and reconciliation
Interviewee: Country Project Coordinator, Ms. Ines Filipa Jose
Date of interview: 25/04/08
Place of interview: OCHA Head-quarters in Bairro dos Combatentes, Luanda
Organisation: Angola Council of Churches (CICA)
Origin: Angola
Activity: Health, human rights, emergency, social services
Interviewee: National Director of the Department of Social Assistance and Development Mr.
Antonio Alfonso Lopes
Date of interview: 28/04/08
Place of interview: CICA Head-quarters in Maianga/Cassenda, Luanda
Organisation: Development Organisation of Netherlands (SNV)
Origin: Netherlands
Activity: Social services, community development (sub-sectors: water and sanitation, micro-credit)
Interviewee: General Director, Mr. Carlos Figuereido
Date of interview: 28/04/08
Place of interview: SNV Head Office in Martal, Luanda
80
